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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) is enabling innovative applications in various
domains and offering convenience in different aspects of people’s life.
Characterised by the constrained resources, heterogeneous techniques and
wide-scale structure, the IoT introduces a variety of known and unknown
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the attackers to break into the systems
to conduct malicious activities (e.g., steal sensitive data, compromise the IoT
devices). Therefore, protecting the IoT to defend against the potential attacks is
of critical importance. The motivation of the thesis lies within the field of the
security modelling and assessment for the IoT to mitigate the impact of potential
attacks. Current research on the IoT security modelling is very limited due to the
pioneering features of the IoT. Besides, there is no previous work on constructing
a formal graphical security model (e.g., Attack Graphs (AGs) [127], Attack
Trees (ATs) [122]) for the IoT. Additionally, traditional defence mechanisms
may not work well in securing the IoT due to the existence of the forever-day
vulnerabilities (i.e., non-patchable vulnerabilities) in the IoT devices. Lastly,
there lacks an approach that can combine different defence mechanisms in an
optimal way to increase the security of the IoT at a reasonable cost. In order to
address the above security issues, we have three goals in the thesis, which are:
(i) to develop the security assessment framework for the IoT that can model and
assess the security of the IoT; (ii) to develop the proactive defence mechanisms
to address the security issues arising from the non-patchable vulnerabilities in
the IoT devices; and (iii) to develop an approach to optimise the combinations of
different defence mechanisms to improve the security of the IoT under the budget
constraint.
To achieve goal (i), we propose a framework for security modelling and
assessment of the IoT, named the security assessment framework for the IoT. The
driving idea behind the framework is to mitigate the impact of potential attacks in
the IoT and increase the IoT security level via the graphical security model along
with the evaluation metrics. Generally, the framework consists of five phases:
1) data processing, 2) security model generation, 3) security visualization, 4)
security analysis, and 5) model updates. By using the framework, we can
identify potential attack paths in the IoT, analyse the security of the IoT using the
well-defined security metrics, and assess the effectiveness of different defence
mechanisms. Three different IoT deployment scenarios are used to evaluate
the framework, which are the smart home, wearable healthcare monitoring
and environment monitoring. The analysis results show the capabilities of the
proposed framework for capturing potential attack paths in both small-scale and
large-scale IoT networks and assessing the effectiveness of the device-centric and
network-level defence mechanisms on mitigating the impact of attacks.
To achieve goal (ii), we propose to change the attack surface of the IoT to
increase the attack effort with the existence of the non-patchable vulnerabilities
in the IoT devices. With the support of software-defined networking (SDN),
we develop two proactive defence mechanisms that reconfigure the network
topology of the IoT. We implement the reconfiguration algorithms and integrate
them with the security assessment framework. We analyse how the security
and performance change when the proposed mechanisms are deployed through
simulations. The results show our proactive defence mechanisms in the SD-IoT
effectively increase the attack effort, while maintaining the performance in terms
of the average shortest path length.
To achieve goal (iii), we propose a novel approach to combine the strategic
deployment of adaptive deception technology and the patch management solution
for the IoT under the budget constraint. We use a graphical security model along
with three evaluation metrics to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the
proposed defence mechanisms. We apply the multi-objective genetic algorithm to
compute the Pareto optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms to maximise
the security and minimise the deployment cost. We present a case study to show
the feasibility of the proposed approach and to provide the defenders with various
ways to choose the optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms for the IoT.
We also compare the runtime and accuracy of the genetic algorithm against the
exhaustive search algorithm. The results show that the genetic algorithm is much
more efficient to compute a good spread of the deployments compared with the
exhaustive search algorithm when the scale of the IoT increases.
In summary, the contributions of the thesis are: (1) the development of the
security assessment framework for the IoT to improve the security of the IoT and
to mitigate the impact of potential attacks; (2) the evaluation of the framework
via various use cases; (3) the development of the defence mechanisms and
reconfiguration algorithms that change the attack surface of the IoT under the
support of SDN to increase the security of the IoT with the non-patchable
vulnerabilities; (4) the development of the approach to compute the optimal
deployments of the defence mechanisms for the IoT under the budget constraint.
Chapter 1
Introduction
In the Internet of Things (IoT), every physical object becomes locatable,
addressable and reachable in the virtual world [114,115,128]. As more and more
objects in the physical world are expected to connect to the Internet, the IoT
is supposed to contain millions or billions of objects which will communicate
with each other and with other entities (e.g., human beings). These objects
not only include computers and laptops which already exist in the traditional
networks, but also contain physical devices (e.g., home appliances, vehicles,
etc). They are connected through heterogeneous communication techniques, for
example, Wi-Fi [57], ZigBee [72], Bluetooth [96], etc. Some IoT devices support
multiple communication techniques and are capable of connecting networks
using different communication protocols. Additionally, many IoT devices have
constrained resources and limited computational capabilities, and are deployed
in an open environment (e.g., street lights) [145].
1.1 Problem Statement
The large number of heterogeneous devices offers people convenience, but
at the same time brings a variety of known and unknown vulnerabilities. The
vulnerabilities reside in various aspects of the IoT systems, including devices
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(hardware, operating systems), communication protocols, service applications,
service APIs and the design of the IoT architecture, etc. By exploiting those
vulnerabilities, an attacker can launch various attacks to compromise the IoT,
including eavesdropping, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, physical damage, node
capture and controlling [115]. These attacks may have catastrophic effects upon
the normal functionality of the IoT. Thus protecting the security of the IoT is
a difficult yet important task. With the presence of complex attacks [7, 8], the
ability to discover potential attack scenarios (e.g., an attacker’s paths to a target
IoT device) by utilising the existing vulnerabilities and to mitigate the impact of
malicious attacks becomes a critical issue.
As a sequence of the IoT devices with the exploitable vulnerabilities can
form the attack paths, it is ideal to remove all the vulnerabilities (e.g., patching
software vulnerabilities). However, it is infeasible to do so according to several
factors. Firstly, as the IoT contains a large number of devices, it is impossible
to remove the vulnerabilities for all devices when taking into account the time,
effort and cost. Moreover, forever-day vulnerabilities cannot be removed, and
unknown vulnerabilities (e.g., zero-day vulnerabilities [27,39]) are impossible to
patch. In specific, for the forever-day vulnerabilities, vendors and suppliers no
longer provide support for their products (e.g., the products have reached their
end-of-support phase); the zero-day vulnerabilities refer to the vulnerabilities
which are unknown to the vendors that are exploited by the attackers, which leave
the vendors with zero day to create patches. Additionally, patching vulnerabilities
can be complicated for users with little or no knowledge about security. This
requires an alternative approach to mitigate the impact of attacks targeting the
IoT while meeting the functionalities and security needs for everyday operations.
When securing the IoT, different combinations of the defence mechanisms
(both device-level and network-level) can be applied for the IoT to defend against
the sophisticated attackers. Here, the sophisticated attackers refer to the attackers
that are capable to collect the intelligence about the target, bypass multiple
layers of the defence mechanisms and use multiple exploits to compromise the
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target. Thus, given a set of the deployments of different defence mechanisms
and a certain budget, selecting the deployments of the defence mechanisms in an
optimal way to maximise the security while minimising the deployment cost is a
critical issue in the IoT.
1.2 Research Questions and Goals
This thesis takes a security modelling approach to target the following research
questions that have not been thoroughly addressed yet:
• Q1: how can we discover the potential attack scenarios by utilising existing
vulnerabilities and mitigate the impact of attacks?
• Q2: how can we protect the IoT with the existence of the non-patchable
vulnerabilities in the IoT devices?
• Q3: how can we select the optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms
to maximise the security of the IoT and minimise the deployment cost?
The goals of the thesis are to advance the security modelling and assessment
for the IoT to deal with the security issues arising from the IoT. Three goals
corresponding to the research questions are described as follows:
• G1: to develop the framework to model and assess the security of the IoT
and to evaluate the framework.
• G2: to develop the defence mechanisms to address the security issues
arising from the non-patchable vulnerabilities in the IoT.
• G3: to develop the approach to compute the optimal deployments of the
defence mechanisms for the IoT.
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1.3 Methodology
We propose the methodology which comprises the systematic analysis of the
procedures to solve the research questions. Five phases are introduced when a
research question is formed. We describe each phase in detail in the following.
System model: we make the assumptions for the IoT networks which will
be analysed based on the real-world networks. The assumptions include the
application scenario (e.g., healthcare, smart home), network component (i.e.,
the types of the nodes in the network), network size (i.e., the number of
each type of the nodes in the network), network deployment (i.e., the area of
the deployment, network topology) and node specification (i.e., the operating
system and applications running on it, communication protocol, vulnerability
information). The abstraction of the real-world systems aims to provide the
information which will be included in the models as accurate as possible. The
assumptions for the IoT networks in a specific scenario are used to validate the
models or the frameworks but do not limit the scope of the research question.
Attacker model: we make the assumptions for the goals and capabilities of
the attackers and the potential attacks that can be carried out by the attackers.
The assumptions can be obtained from the vulnerability information of the nodes
in the IoT networks and the real-world attacks in which these vulnerabilities
are exploited. In specific, the attackers’ capabilities include the access to the
network (i.e., a remote attacker from the Internet or an attacker located in the
local network), the attack tools, the exploitation of the vulnerability information
and the gained privilege after the exploitation. As the attacker model is required
by the graphical security model, we also need to specify the potential entry points
and targets for the attackers.
Defence model: we develop the defence model which comprises the
mechanisms or approaches to improve the security of the IoT networks. The
mechanisms can be in both device-level and network-level. They are designed
and implemented to solve the research question and validated based on the pre-
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defined system model and attacker model.
Framework: we develop the framework which specifies the workflows to
compute the expected results via the graphical security model and the evaluator.
The framework incorporates the system model and attacker model to provide the
inputs into the graphical security model and the evaluator. Some network features
that are defined in the system model need to be provided as the inputs into the
graphical security model and the evaluator, which include the network topology
information, vulnerability information for each node and security metric values
for each vulnerability. The evaluator has a list of the metrics, including different
security metrics and performance metrics to assess the networks. The framework
can also incorporate the defence model in order to define the procedures for
the assessment of the effectiveness of the defence model. New metrics will be
designed in the evaluator to assess the defence model.
Evaluation: we carry out the evaluation via the use cases, case studies or
simulations. The evaluation is to validate either the framework or the defence
model. Besides, the scenarios of the use cases, case studies and simulations are
based on the system model and attacker model.
We describe the usage of the methodology to deal with each proposed research
question in the following.
• For the research question Q1, we develop the framework at first and then
evaluate the framework via different use cases. For each use case, we
define the system model and attacker model as the inputs of the graphical
security model and the evaluator to perform the security assessment and
also provide the defence model to demonstrate the usage of the assessment
of the defence mechanisms.
• For the research questions Q2 and Q3, we define the system model and
attacker model at first. Afterwards, we develop the defence model and
define the procedures in the framework to validate the defence model via
the simulations.
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1.4 Research Contributions
Four primary contributions are proposed in the following to the graphical
security modelling and assessment for the IoT.
1. Development and formal definition of the security assessment framework
for the IoT: we propose a framework for security modelling and
assessment of the IoT (the work has been published in [48, 50]). The
framework is used to construct a graphical security model (in particular, a
scalable security model named Hierarchical Attack Representation Model
(HARM) [58]) and a security evaluator to automate the security analysis
of the IoT. The security evaluator uses various security metrics to assess
the security and interacts with an analytic modelling and evaluation tool,
Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability and Performance Evaluator
(SHARPE) [121], to output the analysis results.
2. Evaluation of the security assessment framework via different use cases:
we evaluate the framework using three use cases, including a smart home,
wearable healthcare monitoring and environment monitoring (the work has
been published in [48, 50]). In each use case, we create the example IoT
network, construct the graphical security model, carry out security analysis
based on the calculated metrics and assess the effectiveness of the defence
mechanisms.
3. Security analysis of the software-defined IoT with the non-patchable
vulnerabilities: in the cases that we cannot remove the vulnerabilities, we
can change the attack surface of the IoT to increase the attack efforts (the
work has been published in [49]). Recently, software-defined networking
(SDN) is foreseen as a key enabler for the IoT as the SDN is able to manage
large-scale networks, establish complex routing topologies and simplify
user operations [63, 76, 105, 126]. In particular, it centralises the network
control and provides a dynamic, flexible and automated reconfiguration
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of the networks. Current work has already shown the possibility and
feasibility to integrate the SDN with the IoT (Section ??). We reconfigure
the network topology of the IoT based on the SDN functions and conduct
security and performance analysis via the security assessment framework.
4. Computation of the optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms:
we consider two defence mechanisms to increase the security of the
IoT networks and compute the optimal deployments of these defence
mechanisms using the security assessment framework with the addition of
the multi-objective optimisation algorithm (the work has been submitted
to a conference A). The defence mechanisms include (1) the deception
technology to divert the attackers from the real assets and (2) the security
patch management solution to reduce the attack surface.
In summary, the security assessment framework with the additional
reconfiguration and optimisation modules is proposed to model and assess the
security of the IoT, to increase the security of the IoT with the non-patchable
vulnerabilities under the support of SDN and to compute the optimal deployments
of the defence mechanisms for the IoT. Use cases and case studies are introduced
to demonstrate the viability of the framework and simulations are performed to
evaluate the proposed mechanisms and algorithms.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the current
research in the field of security modelling and assessment for the IoT. Chapter 3
presents the description and formal definition of the framework for modelling and
assessing the security of the IoT and the evaluation of the framework via three use
cases (addressing the research goal G1). Chapter 4 proposes the security analysis
of the software-defined IoT with the non-patchable vulnerabilities (addressing
the research goal G2). Chapter 5 provides the computation of the optimal defence
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mechanisms for the IoT under the budget constraint (addressing the research goal
G3). Chapter 6 discusses the usability and limitations of the thesis and points out
the future research directions. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we first begin with discussing current work on security models
for the non-IoT networks and IoT in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. In
Section 2.3, we discuss the current SDN solutions for the IoT to investigate
the viability of integrating SDN with the IoT. In Section 2.4, we present the
work addressing the security issues of the SD-IoT. Then we present the current
approaches on the optimal selection of the defence mechanisms for the IoT
in Section 2.5 and investigate the cyber deception technologies in the IoT in
Section 2.6. In Section 2.7, we summarise the main problems that require further
investigation and point out our approaches.
2.1 Security Models for the Non-IoT Networks
Graphical security models have been widely used for the security analysis in
various types of the non-IoT networks. We discuss the tree-based models, graph-
based models, HARMs and related model generation tools.
Tree-based models: Mauw et al. [93] proposed a formal representation of ATs
including the definition, transformations between ATs, calculations of attribute
values associated with ATs and the projection algorithm applied to answer
questions of people’s interests (e.g., which attack causes damage over a certain
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limit).
Ten et al. [133] presented an analytical approach to evaluate the vulnerabilities
in the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system using ATs. An
AT was constructed according to attack goals and used to evaluate vulnerability
indices for each attack leaf, each intrusion scenario and the overall system based
on security conditions, countermeasures and password policies. A case study for
the power system control network was conducted to identify possible break-in
points and to evaluate the vulnerabilities.
Saini et al. [122] proposed the idea of threat modelling using ATs. They
constructed an AT for an online certificate repository in the Grid Security
Infrastructure toolkit and analysed possible attacks and impacts caused by the
attacks.
Roy et al. [117] proposed attack countermeasure trees (ACTs) for the security
analysis by taking into account both attacks and defence mechanisms. In the
ACT, defence mechanisms can be deployed on any node of the tree instead of
only leaf nodes. Qualitative and probabilistic analysis can be performed using the
ACT to evaluate the security of the network. Besides, structural and Birnbaum
importance measures can be used to prioritise attacks and countermeasures
respectively. They implemented the ACT in the SHARPE and showed the
usability of their model in three case studies: ACTs for a BGP attack, a SCADA
attack and a malicious insider attack.
Graph-based models: Jha et al. [68] proposed an algorithm to generate AGs
using a model checking technique for vulnerability analysis. Their algorithm
can compute all potential attacks and contain only relevant states of the network
and the intruder. They also designed minimisation analysis approaches on attack
graphs to formalise the security analysis and incorporated probabilities into AGs
to perform reliability analysis.
Ou et al. [107] developed a vulnerability analysis tool to analyse the security
impact of software vulnerabilities on networks. The tool automatically processes
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bug reports from existing vulnerability scanners and generates AGs to perform
the security analysis. The tool was implemented on Red Hat Linux. They
tested the tool in a testbed with 500 Linux hosts connected via the Internet. The
results showed their tool ran efficiently and identified a policy violation caused
by vulnerabilities.
Ingols et al. [65] improved the AG generation tool designed in [66]. They
considered client-side vulnerabilities, zero-day vulnerabilities and two common
countermeasures including personal firewalls and intrusion prevention systems.
They also redesigned the methods for computing network reachability to
support reverse reachability (i.e., compute reachability from the malicious
server backwards to the vulnerable clients). The experiments were carried
out using a real network with 85 hosts and larger simulated networks. The
results demonstrated that the enhanced tool is as scalable as their tool in [66].
Their future work includes modelling additional countermeasures, attacks and
adversaries, and performing field tests.
Albanese et al. [16] used AGs to efficiently generate network hardening
solutions. They defined a network hardening strategy as a set of atomic
defence actions and introduced a cost model which takes into account the cost
of interdependent actions. Then they designed an approximation algorithm to
compute the minimum-cost hardening solution. The experiments were carried
out using synthetic attack graphs and the results validated the performance of
their approach. The evaluation of the proposed approach using real attack graphs
will be included in their future work.
HARMs: Hong et al. [58] developed the two-layer graphical security model
called HARM to assess the security of enterprise networks. The HARM is
generated using network topology information in the upper layer and host
vulnerability information in the lower layer. They performed complexity analysis
on the HARM, AG and AT and concluded the HARM has smaller or equal
computational complexity in the model construction, evaluation (i.e., calculation
of attack paths) and update (e.g., host addition or removal) phases of the security
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analysis.
Hong et al. extended the previous paper and performed the scalability analysis
of the multi-layered HARM in [60]. They compared the two-layered and three-
layered HARMs with the single-layered AGs in terms of the model construction
and evaluation. The simulation results demonstrated that the HARM is more
scalable than the single-layered AG. In particular, the three-layered HARM was
found to be more scalable than the two-layered HARM.
Jia et al. [69] developed a software tool to generate AGs and HARMs from
scanning reports, and to convert existing AGs into HARMs. They also designed
a visualisation tool to visualise AGs and HARMs. The feasibility of the tool
was evaluated using an example enterprise network. Their future work includes
supporting different types of HARMs (e.g., using ATs in the upper layer and AGs
in the lower layer) and improving collection of network reachability information.
2.2 Security Models for the IoT
Several papers focus on developing the security modelling approaches for the
IoT. We discuss them in three aspects: security frameworks, game-based security
modelling and adaptive security models.
Security frameworks: several papers proposed a framework for the security
modelling and analysis of the IoT. Most papers only presented a high-level
description or a theoretical framework without any evaluation work [94,113,130,
144] or with incomplete analysis [18, 19, 64]. Some papers performed analysis
or simulations to validate the framework [15, 101, 102]. However, the proposed
frameworks in the papers require the domain-specific knowledge of the IoT which
complicates the model construction. Besides, there is also a scalability issue
in [15].
Radomirovic [113] proposed a dense IoT model along with a Dolev-Yao
adversary model to address security and privacy issues of communication
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 25
protocols in the IoT. The dense IoT is defined as an asynchronous communication
network with high connectivity and ubiquitous functionality. An attacker model
is also introduced in which the adversary has corruption and fingerprinting
abilities. The paper pointed out future work towards a formal model limiting
the adversary’s capabilities.
Yang et al. [144] presented a high-level security framework for the IoT. The
framework is based on a model encompassing three interlinked elements, which
are communication, control and computation. They regarded the IoT as the
linkage between control and computation. The computation algorithms have a
direct influence on the end devices. As the direct control can be intervened
by attackers, they put security control between computation and control. They
concluded protecting IoT is not only a technical issue but also a social issue.
Stepanova et al. [130] proposed a theoretical framework for modelling the IoT
security based on graph theory. By defining the IoT as “net of nets of things”,
they designed formalised network property indicators to assess the sustainability
of nets of things (NoT) and described a method to maintain the sustainability
of the NoT entities. Their future work includes the efficiency evaluation of the
method with pre-defined indicators.
Atamli et al. [19] provided a threat model which consists of three sources of
threats and eight types of attack vectors to determine where efforts should be
invested to secure systems. Using the threat model, they analysed the impact of
threats and deduced the security and privacy properties for the IoT based on three
use cases: power management, smart car and smart healthcare system. Their
future work includes the design of a security package that can be used for any use
case.
Huang et al. [64] proposed a security framework named SecIoT under the 5th
generation wireless system. SecIoT consists of a secure authentication system,
which employs the multi-channel security protocol for device authentication, a
role-based access control mechanism with fine-grained roles, and a risk indicator
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interface based on security risk analysis techniques. A prototype IoT was
presented with an authentication protocol analysis and user acceptance studies on
access control and risk indicator. The user studies indicated that a fine-grained
role-based access control should be supported in the IoT and that a risk tree map
is the best way to represent risks. Their future work includes the development of
availability enhancement and trust management into the framework.
Ashraf et al. [18] proposed an overview of threat mitigation approaches
in the IoT based on “autonomic security”. They classified these approaches
into self-protecting, self-healing and hybrid of self-protecting and self-healing,
and discussed their usage against different threats in three layers: machine-to-
machine, network and cloud.
Mohsin et al. [101] designed and implemented a formal framework for the
security analysis of the domain-specific IoT networks. The framework models
the behaviours of the IoT devices, user-defined policies (e.g., IF-THIS-THEN-
THAT) and threats using the Satisfiability Modulo Theories logics to discover the
hidden attack vectors. They evaluated the framework via a Building Management
System. Their future work mainly includes the visualisation of the threat
verification and risk analysis of the IoT against various threats.
Mohsin et al. [102] proposed a risk verification framework which can be
used in conjunction with the framework in [101] to automate the security
analysis for the IoT. The framework takes the inputs of the IoT configurations,
operational policies, vulnerability information and attacker capabilities to
generate the Markov Decision Process model and then computes the risk
exposure probabilities for the configurations using the Markov model and
probabilistic model checking. They evaluated the framework via a home security
scenario to show that the framework can prioritise the configurations based on
risk exposures.
Mavropoulos et al. [94] developed a software tool to visualise the IoT systems
which facilitates the security analysis. The tool is based on the APPARATUS
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framework [95] which identifies the IoT assets and threats during the design
phase and vulnerabilities during the implementation phase.
Agadakos et al. [15] proposed a formal way to model the cyber and physical
interactions of the IoT devices under user-defined policies to reveal potential
attack paths. They implemented the proposed approach using Alloy which is
a specification language and a structural modelling tool. Three IoT use cases
were introduced to evaluate the viability and efficacy of the approach. The
performance analysis was also carried out and the results show the approach only
works well with small-scale IoT networks.
Game-based security modelling: several papers addressed game-based
security modelling for the IoT. However, their scope either focused on mitigating
the impact of certain attacks [35] or emphasised model solutions for specific
domains [56, 82, 116].
Hamdi et al. [56] constructed a Markov game-theoretic model to support
decision making in the realm of IoT healthcare applications. Specifically, for
smart things, the decision of whether or not to authenticate a forwarding packet
is based on the assessment of power life, channel bandwidth, memory capacity
and compromised nodes through the game-based model. The performance of the
model was evaluated through simulation which showed smart things extend their
lifetime by adopting the adaptive security policy.
Chen et al. [35] proposed a fusion-based defence mechanism to mitigate the
impacts of intentional attacks in the IoT architecture. They formulated a zero-sum
game between the defence strategy and the attacker. In the worst-case scenario,
the attacker knows the network topology and is capable of compromising
all nodes simultaneously. The results of performance evaluation showed the
robustness of the IoT was greatly enhanced by the proposed mechanism.
Rontidis et al. [116] developed a decision support method which minimises
security risks in the field of IoT prosumer selection. A prosumer offers
applications or services in the IoT service deployment stages. They formulated
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a non-cooperative and complete information game between the user and the
attacker. The worst-case scenario was considered where the attacker knows all
security controls of prosumers. Following this scenario, a mixed strategy was
proposed to randomise the prosumer selection in an optimal way and compared
with two heuristic solutions through simulation which proved the effectiveness of
the strategy in mitigating security risks.
Lee et al. [82] proposed a game theory-based approach for the security analysis
of social IoT networks. They identified the attack and security actions via
the attack tree, modelled the interactions between the attacker and security
administrator using a non-cooperative game and then calculated the payoffs based
on the cost of actions and attack impact. The case study in a smart home network
was performed to validate the effectiveness of the approach.
Adaptive security models: since 2012, adaptive security has been utilised
in the Adaptive Security for Smart Internet of Things (ASSET) project which
aims at developing the risk-based adaptive security methods and mechanisms for
the IoT. Adaptive security refers to a security solution that learns and adapts to
changing environments dynamically, and identifies and responds to the unknown
threats. As the IoT is a dynamic system, security mechanisms implemented in the
IoT should adapt to the dynamic context. There are a number of papers published
from the project. However, their solutions were only designed for the eHealth
domain.
Savola et al. [125] investigated security objectives of the IoT applications in an
eHealth scenario and proposed the definition of a high-level adaptive security
management mechanism using security metrics. The proposed mechanism is
a cyclic process consisting of four critical models, which are adaptive security
monitoring, analytics and predictive models, decision-making models, and
metrics-based adaptive security models.
Abie et al. [14] introduced the adaptive framework with the emphasis on
the adaptive risk management. Based on the continuous cyclic process, the
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framework provides security solutions adaptively upon the estimations of risk
damage and benefits and evaluates solutions through the security metrics. A
patient-monitoring case study was indicated to be used for validating the
framework in the future simulation experiment.
In order to accurately evaluate the adaptive security solutions (e.g., [14]) in real-
life scenarios and realistic simulations, Berhanu et al. [22] presented a design and
implementation of a testbed with heterogeneous biomedical sensors (Shimmer
nodes and Raspberry Pi Mini-PC with eHealth sensor shields). The testbed was
set up using off-the-shelf hardware and open source software and then validated
using the impact of antenna orientation on the energy consumption of sensors.
The experimental results showed that the testbed functions well, thus being useful
in studying the feasibility of the adaptive solutions.
Torjusen et al. [136] investigated the run-time adaptive behaviour which
deviates from the normal activities of the system. It was regarded as a major
threat to the sustainability of the IoT-enabled eHealth services. Based on the
risk-based adaptive security framework in [14], they developed a self-adaptive
security framework by introducing run-time verification methods. Four run-
time verification enablers were integrated into every phase of the initial feedback
loop, which are models at run-time, requirements at run-time, dynamic context
monitoring and a runtime verification component. The new framework was
instantiated by means of Coloured Petri Nets.
Hamdi et al.’s work mentioned above (i.e., [56]) is also part of the ASSET
project. In their future work, they considered the implementation of the game-
based model in the testbed [22].
Habib et al. [54] identified assets, vulnerabilities and threats for eHealth
applications and proposed a threat detection and prevention mechanism based
on adaptive security. Generally, security events are at first gathered by sensors
and monitoring components in devices, then analysed to determine whether the
events are threats or not. From the analysis, a planning function decides actions
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on the events via a knowledge base or learning mechanism. Thus, based on
their analysis, the adaptive security mechanism is able to adjust security levels
according to the threat levels.
2.3 SDN Solutions for the IoT
Current SDN solutions for the IoT were proposed in three aspects, which
include the management of sensing devices in the WSNs, management of user
devices in the mobile networks [43] and management of smart devices in the IoT
architectures.
SDN for the WSNs: solutions were designed for managing sensing devices
inside a WSN. Most solutions were based on flow tables [46,47,89,90,134,137]
while one solution provided reconfigurable sensors [100].
Mahmud et al. [90] introduced the OpenFlow-based sensor, named “flow-
sensor”, to address the reliability issue of the sensor networks. The flow-sensor
uses a control interface to exchange control packets with the Controller and
maintains the flow tables for communicating with access points and other flow-
sensors. They carried out simulations to validate their design. The simulation
results showed that flow-sensors generate less number of packets and use less
time compared with traditional sensors.
Luo et al. [89] proposed an architecture of a software-defined WSN to
address the issues in WSN. They designed a Sensor OpenFlow protocol for the
communication between the control plane and data plane based on the OpenFlow
specification (v1.3.0).
Gante et al. [47] developed a framework for a software-defined WSN. In the
framework, sensor nodes forward or drop packets based on a set of pre-installed
rules, known as the flow table. The flow table is generated by a logically
centralised Controller which was assumed to be implemented as part of the base
station. A generic architecture of the base station was proposed to describe the
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reconfiguration abilities of the base station in the SDN paradigm. Their future
work includes the investigation of multiple Controllers and the communication
protocols and the implementation of the proposed framework.
Trevizan de Oliveira et al. [137] designed and implemented a TinyOS-
based and hardware independent architecture for software-defined WSNs. The
architecture consists of SDN-enabled sensor nodes and one or multiple SDN
Controllers. They implemented the SDN-enabled sensor node in the TelosB
mote and the Controller as a software. They carried out experiments on COOJA
simulator and measured delay time of packet forwarding. Their future work
includes the measurement of energy consumption for packet forwarding and
implementation of a manager application server providing APIs for developing
applications.
Miyazaki et al. [100] proposed a prototype system of a software-defined
WSN. The system consists of a role generation and delivery mechanism and
reconfigurable sensor nodes. In the mechanism, roles are generated based
on the user-defined scenario description and delivered to sensor nodes. They
implemented the mechanism in a server PC connected with 16 reconfigurable
sensor nodes and a base station. The experiment results demonstrated that the
role assignment can be applied to all sensor nodes within a reasonable amount of
time.
Galluccio et al. [46] proposed and implemented a stateful SDN solution for
WSNs. The solution decreases the exchanged data between the sensor nodes and
the Controller and provides APIs for designing new applications. They used a
simulated network on OMNeT++ simulator. They also carried out experiment
in a testbed with 5 sensor nodes and 1 sink and analysed the network performance
through the round trip time, payload and Controller’s response time. Their future
work will address security issues of their solution.
Theodorou et al. [134] used SDN to improve the topology control for the
WSNs. They designed two topology control algorithms and implemented them
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as modules in the Controller in a testing framework. The testing framework also
consists of COOJA simulator and a platform connecting the Controller and the
data plane. Their experimental results show that the algorithms can reduce the
latency in the topology discovery phase and achieve good performance in the flow
establishment. Their future work mainly includes the analysis of heterogeneous
and mobile IoT scenarios and experiments in the real testbeds.
SDN for the mobile networks: several SDN solutions were provided in
heterogeneous wireless networks to support the end-to-end flows. The wireless
networks include future carrier networks, wireless access networks and radio
access networks.
Pentikousis et al. [109] developed a software-defined mobile network
architecture for future carrier networks. The architecture consists of the
MobileFlow forwarding engine (MFFE) and MobileFlow Controller (MFC).
MFFEs forward packets to the IP/Ethernet-based transport network using flow
rules received from the MFC. They validated the flexibility and programmability
of the architecture in the On-Demand Mobile Network prototype testbed.
Lei et al. [83] proposed a framework of a software-defined wireless access
network for an open campus WLAN. The framework introduces a logically
centralised Controller, multiple physical access points (APs) and software access
points (SAPs) running on top of APs. Each AP can have multiple SAPs to manage
AP associations of user equipments. They presented use cases of the framework
in two network applications, seamless handover and load balancing. Their future
work includes optimisation of the handover and load balancing algorithms.
Bernardos et al. [24] developed a SDN-based mobile network architecture for
a mobile network operator. In the architecture, multiple heterogeneous radio
access networks (RANs), including the UTRAN (UMTS), EUTRAN (LET) and
a Wi-Fi hotspot, are connected to a transport core network. RANs and the
transport core network are composed of programmable devices. The logically
centralised SDN Controller communicates with northbound interfaces (service
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providers, operators) and southbound interfaces (RANS, the core network). They
presented a case study to describe the interactions between the components in
the architecture when the user equipment is attached to a RAN, moves to another
RAN and requests a service.
Wu et al. [142] proposed a software-defined system architecture for mobile
management and flow control in the IoT multi-networks. In the architecture,
the IoT devices connect to heterogeneous access points in different partitions
(geographical areas) of the network and request data from data servers.
Distributed SDN Controllers are connected via partially interconnected switches
and support two types of flows: flows between the data servers and the IoT
devices, flows between the IoT devices in different partitions. Based on
this architecture, they proposed methods for mobility management and flow
scheduling and performed simulations and experiments in the testbed. The results
show that the SD-IoT system achieves satisfactory and stable performance in flow
control and mobility management.
SDN for the IoT architectures: a few papers focused on managing smart
devices in the software-defined IoT architectures. However, there lacks
simulations or experiments to validate the architecture.
Hakiri et al. [55] proposed an IoT architecture that integrates SDN and
message-oriented publish/subscribe data distribution service (DDS) middleware.
In this architecture, smart devices connect to SDN-enabled IoT gateways which
then connect to SDN forwarding devices. A SDN Controller communicates with
SDN forwarding devices via southbound APIs. IoT applications communicate
with the Controller via the DDS middleware. They discussed several
open research issues addressed by the proposed architecture (e.g., mobility,
scalability).
Liu et al. [85] proposed a SD-IoT architecture for smart urban sensing.
This architecture consists of three layers: the physical layer is composed of
sensor platforms, gateways, forwarding devices and servers in the Cloud and
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is responsible for gathering and transmitting data in an urban environment;
the control layer is composed of multiple Controllers (sensor controller,
network controller and Cloud controller) for managing physical devices via the
southbound APIs and providing data to applications in the application layer via
the northbound APIs. They used a case study and a quantitative analysis to show
the benefits of the SD-IoT.
2.4 Security Issues of the SD-IoT
There are several papers dealing with the security issues of the SD-IoT. Most
papers proposed the approaches to defend against the network-level attacks [31,
33, 124, 143] while one paper focused on the device-level protection [104].
Chakrabarty et al. [33] proposed a secure communication protocol by using
SDN for the IoT. They used the concept of Black Network to encrypt both
the meta-data and the payload in the link layer and network layer. The
SDN Controller acts as a trusted third party with a global network view and
communicates with the resource-constrained IoT devices via Black packets. They
conducted simulations using different topologies and node states (i.e., asleep or
awake mode). The results show that the architecture provides a higher level of
security while complicates routing compared with existing 802.15.4 protocols.
Their future work mainly includes the improvement of routing mechanisms and
methods for securing the link layer frame.
Sandor et al. [124] introduced a hybrid network architecture for the IoT and
designed an algorithm to switch between redundant paths using SDN against
DoS attacks. The hybrid architecture consists of SDN switches and non-SDN
segments with redundant communication entry points. The algorithm performs
automatic switching between redundant entry points by using SDN switches.
They conducted experiments to evaluate the performance of the reconfiguration
capabilities of the hybrid architecture and the impact on the resilience of the IoT
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communications. The results show that the architecture mitigates the impact of a
DoS attack on a non-SDN part of the network.
Bull et al. [31] developed a SDN-based gateway for the traffic analysis of
the IoT devices. The SDN-based gateway consists of the basic SDN switch
function for data forwarding, statistic manager for data collection and mitigation
actions upon detection of attacks. They implemented the gateway using the POX
controller and carried out TCP and ICMP flood attacks to demonstrate the usage
of the gateway. Their future work includes testbed development and abstraction
of the component as a service.
Nobakht et al. [104] proposed a host-based intrusion detection and mitigation
framework to capture attacks in the smart home networks. The framework
uses machine learning techniques to analyse the traffic of the IoT devices
and OpenFlow rules to block or redirect malicious traffic launched from the
compromised devices. They implemented the framework as a module of the
Floodlight controller and performed experiment through a smart lighting system.
Xu et al. [143] proposed a mechanism to defend against the new-flow attack
in the SDN-based IoT (in which the IoT devices send packets to the SDN
switches instead of the IoT gateways). The new flow attack refers to the attack
that exhausts the SDN switches. The mechanism includes a low-cost monitor
method to detect the suspicious flow burst and a mitigation method to redirect the
malicious flows. They performed simulations and implemented the mechanism
as an application on the OpenDaylight controller in the testbed to validate the
feasibility of the approach.
2.5 Security Optimisation for the IoT
There is only a few work on the optimal selection of the defence mechanisms
for the IoT.
Rullo et al. [118] proposed an approach to reasonably allocate security
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resources for securing the IoT networks. They modelled the interactions between
the defender and attacker as a Stackelberg game and computed the best security
resource allocation plan by minimising the maximum risk, maximum criticality,
energy consumption and allocation cost. Three scenarios were introduced and
the experiment was carried out for one scenario of the wireless sensor networks
with different security tools, including installation of an IDS on network node,
addition of highly sensitive transceiver and use of tamper resistant sensor nodes.
Rullo et al. [119] proposed another approach to compute the optimal security
resource allocation plan for the IoT networks with mobile nodes. A risk metric
in economics was introduced and a genetic algorithm was used to evaluate the
allocation plans with the measure. They simulated a selective forwarding attack
and measured packet delivery rate via the proposed approach.
Both of the work only consider device-level mechanisms but lack the evaluation
of network-level defence mechanisms. Besides, they made the assumption that
the attacker needs to compromise the security resource to carry out further
attacks. However, in real world cases, sophisticated attackers are able to remain
undetected and compromise the IoT devices directly.
2.6 Cyber Deception in the IoT
Several papers were proposed in the development of the honeypot technology
for the IoT.
Pa et al. [108] developed an IoT honeypot to emulate the IoT devices and
to capture Telnet-based attacks and designed the IoT sandbox to analyse these
attacks against the IoT devices running different CPU architectures. They
identified four families of malware that target Telnet-enabled IoT devices. Their
future work includes the extension of the IoT honeypot and the sandbox to
support more protocols and architectures respectively.
La et al. [77] introduced a game theoretic model to analyse the security of
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honeypot-enabled IoT networks. They assumed that the attacker may deceive
the defender with suspicious or seemingly normal traffic and used honeypot-
enabled intrusion detection component which reroutes the suspicious traffic to
the honeypots as the defence mechanism. The interaction between the attacker
and defender was modelled as a Bayesian game with incomplete information.
They presented numerical results to verify the proposed model.
Anirudh et al. [17] used honeypots for the online servers for mitigating DDoS
attacks launched from the IoT devices. They carried out simulations via a
client and server model implemented in Python. Their future work includes the
validation of the approach in the real-time environment and the analysis of more
types of attacks.
Dowling et al. [42] created a honeypot that simulates a ZigBee gateway and
used it to capture attacks for further analysis. They identified that most captured
attacks are Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and bot malware.
2.7 Summary
From the current security modelling approaches for the IoT in Section 2.2,
there is no previous work on discovering the potential attack scenarios in the IoT
in order to protect the IoT under the various attacks. In this thesis, we focus on
constructing a formal graphical security model along with the security evaluator
to capture the potential attack paths and analyse the security of the IoT without
or with different defence mechanisms. There are several benefits of using a
graphical security model. Firstly, all potential attack paths can be captured in
the model, whence solutions are no longer limited to defending against specific
attacks. Moreover, the formal model can be used to analyse the security of
various IoT scenarios. Lastly, it provides an intuitive way to analyse the security
weaknesses of systems and to evaluate the potential countermeasures because
the sequences of the attackers’ actions are captured in the model. The outcomes
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include a security assessment framework that can capture potential attack paths
in the IoT via the graphical security model and analyse the security of the IoT via
the security metrics and a comprehensive evaluation of different IoT networks in
various scenarios.
From the current SDN approaches for the IoT security in Section 2.3, there
is no previous work on improving the security of the IoT with non-patchable
vulnerabilities under the support of SDN. After investigating the current SDN
solutions for the IoT in Section 2.4, it is feasible to manage different types of
the devices in three scenarios: sensing devices in the WSNs, user devices in the
mobile networks and smart devices in the IoT architectures. However, there is
a lack of unified SDN solutions for controlling the heterogeneous end devices
in the IoT architecture. As the WSNs play a key role in the connectivity of the
smart objects in the IoT and there are already several papers on designing and
implementing the software-defined sensor networks, we design proactive defence
mechanisms for the software-defined sensor networks in the IoT scenarios,
develop the reconfiguration algorithms to change the network topology and
analyse the security and performance of these networks via the graphical security
model and the security evaluator. The outcomes consist of the development
of the defence mechanisms and evaluation of the mechanisms via the security
assessment framework.
From the current optimisation approaches for the IoT in Section 2.5, there is
no previous work on combining different defence mechanisms and evaluating the
effectiveness of these mechanisms on the IoT via the graphical security model.
After investigating the cyber deception technologies for the IoT in 2.6, there is
no research on the analysis and evaluation of the modern deception technology
for the IoT. In this thesis, we propose to use the graphical security model along
with the evaluation metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of different deployments
of the defence mechanisms (including the modern deception technology and
patch solution) and apply the multi-objective genetic algorithm to compute the
optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms. The outcomes consist of
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the development of the evaluation metrics for the defence mechanisms and the
optimisation problem for the IoT security, and the evaluation of the optimisation
approach.
Chapter 3
Security Assessment Framework for
the IoT
Graph-based and tree-based security models (e.g., attack graphs (AGs) [127],
attack trees (ATs) [122]) have been widely used to assess the security of various
systems [61, 75]. In the graph-based attack models, an AG shows all possible
sequences of the attackers’ actions that eventually reach the target. With the
increasing size of the network, calculation of a complete AG has exponential
complexity, thus causing a scalability issue. In the tree-based attack models, an
AT is a tree with nodes representing the attacks and the root representing the goal
of attacks. It systematically presents potential attacks in the network. However,
an AT also has the scalability issue when the size of the network increases.
In order to address the above issues, the two-layered HARM [58] was
introduced, which can combine various graphical security models onto different
layers. In the two-layered HARM, the upper layer captures the network
reachability information and the lower layer represents the vulnerability
information of each node in the network. The layers of the HARM can be
constructed independently of each other. This decreases the computational
complexity of calculating and evaluating the HARM compared with the
calculation and evaluation of the existing single-layered graphical security
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models. Thus, the two-layered HARM addresses the scalability problem of the
single-layered AG and AT. To further improve the scalability, the three-layered
HARM was developed in [60] with the subnet reachability at the highest layer.
We use the three-layered HARM as our graphical security model in the security
assessment framework for the IoT.
In this chapter, we discuss current work on the security modelling for the
IoT, present the description of the security assessment framework for the IoT,
the formal definitions of the framework and the graphical security model (i.e.,
the three-layered HARM), the detailed calculation steps of security metrics and
a comprehensive evaluation using both heterogeneous and homogeneous IoT
networks to validate the framework.
To the best of our knowledge, this framework is the first approach to use a
graphical security model in modelling and assessing security for the IoT. The
main contributions are summarised as follows:
• Propose a framework for modelling and assessing security of the IoT
(Section 3.2);
• Develop a scalable graphical security model to compute attack scenarios
(Section 3.2);
• Formally define the framework (Section 3.2.2);
• Use various security metrics to carry out the analysis (Section 3.2.2.3); and
• Evaluate the framework using three scenarios, including a smart home,
wearable healthcare monitoring and environment monitoring (Section 3.3).
3.1 Introduction to the Attacker Models for the IoT
Before the description and definition of the security assessment framework, we
introduce an overview of the potential attacker models for the IoT at first. All
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the attacker models presented in the thesis fall into this range. In specific, the
attacker models for the IoT are classified by threats and discussed in [115]. We
list them in the following.
• Eavesdropping/sniffing attacks: passive attackers can eavesdrop wireless
or wired communication channels, capture packets and extract sensitive
information from the packets. As many IoT devices have constrained
resources and low computational power, it is infeasible to deploy strong
security protections on the devices. For example, in a ZigBee-based
network using standard security mode, the network key is transmitted over-
the-air in plaintext [106, 139]. Therefore, eavesdropping can be easily
carried out by malicious attackers and usually used as their first step for
performing further attacks. Moreover, if there are internal attackers within
the network, they are able to capture any information flow within the
network.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks: in [141], a DoS attack is defined as
any event that reduces or eliminates the network’s normal functionality.
Various factors can cause DoS attacks, including hardware failures,
software vulnerabilities, resource exhaustion, etc. These attacks are more
disruptive for the IoT as the IoT devices can be easily compromised due
to limited security protections, and then controlled by attackers as zombie
devices [147]. Moreover, such attacks have already been carried out by
attackers in the real world [30].
• Physical damage: it is obvious that active attackers can destroy IoT devices
easily as many devices are objects or properties located in our surrounding
environment (e.g., home appliances, street lights, wearable devices).
• Node capture: instead of damaging the IoT devices, active attackers can
also capture them, reprogram them and extract critical data from them [36].
For example, if a home-owner discards the ZigBee-based device without
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the revocation of keys, the attacker is able to get the dumping device
and launch the side-channel timing attack against the microcontroller by
exploiting and programming JTAG [112].
• Controlling: if there is an attack path, active attackers might be able to
manipulate the full or partial IoT network by compromising and gaining
access to critical devices in the IoT.
3.2 Description and Formulation of the Framework
The main goals of the framework are to identify all possible attack paths in the
IoT, evaluate the security level of the IoT through security metrics, and assess
the effectiveness of different defence mechanisms. The proposed framework is
shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Phases in the proposed framework.
3.2.1 Framework Description
There are five phases in the framework: 1) data processing, 2) security model
generation, 3) security visualisation, 4) security analysis, and 5) model updates.
We explain each phase in the following.
In phase 1, the security decision maker (e.g., network security administrator)
mainly provides two inputs needed to construct an IoT network: system
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information and security metrics. First, the system information includes the
subnets forming the IoT, node information and network topology for each subnet,
and the vulnerability information for each node. The subnets can be classified
based on the virtual local area networks (VLANs) that devices belong to, the
communication protocols that devices use, etc. The classification method can
be determined by the security decision maker. In this chapter, we use the
communication protocols as the subnet classification method for the IoT nodes.
Therefore some devices may belong to several subnets due to the communication
protocols they use. The vulnerability information can be discovered by the
scanning tools [91, 111, 120]. We collect and use the vulnerabilities from the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [120] or existing literature. We
use a static IoT network, thus all the inputs are fixed after the network generation.
Then the system information is fed into the IoT Generator. The IoT Generator
creates an IoT network consisting of the specified subnets with network topology
information and node vulnerability information. Second, the security decision
maker also selects the security metrics, which will be used as an input into the
security analysis phase.
In phase 2, we generate the three-layered HARM of the IoT network created
in phase 1. Specifically, the Security Model Generator takes the constructed
network with topology and vulnerability information as inputs and generates the
three-layered HARM of the network. Based on the HARM, we compute all
possible attack paths in the IoT network. An attack path specifies a sequence
of nodes that the attacker can compromise to reach the target node. The model
supports multiple attackers and multiple targets (e.g., attackers in different places,
a group of devices as the targets).
The three-layered HARM is based on the two-layered HARM developed in [59]
and extends the HARM to three layers. They represent the subnet connectivity
information in the upper layer, the network reachability information (i.e., nodes
connected in the topological structure) in the middle layer and the vulnerability
information of nodes in the lower layer, respectively. Compared to the two-
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layered HARM, the three-layered HARM additionally describes the subnets
and their connectivity. Apart from generating the three-layered HARM for the
overall IoT, we can choose various sets of subnets, construct the HARM for the
chosen set of subnets and also combine several three-layered HARMs based on
the subnet connectivity. When the IoT contains a large number of nodes, the
subnet division makes the model construction and further security evaluation
more flexible. Additionally, the mobility of devices (e.g., node addition or
removal) can be easily adjusted in the three-layer HARM without reconstruction
of the whole model. Moreover, by grouping devices into different subnets
based on their communication protocols, we are able to model any IoT with
a wide variety of heterogeneous communication technologies, thus addressing
the heterogeneity issue of the IoT. As each layer is constructed independently,
the three-layered HARM improves the scalability of the two-layered HARM.
Besides, the complexity of the security evaluation is further decreased because
computations are grouped in each layer using a bottom-up approach. Lastly,
more layers can be used based on different IoT scenarios. For example, a smart
home with several networks (e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, etc) can be modelled using
the three-layer HARM; a number of smart homes in an area can be modelled
using the four-layer HARM with the home connectivity in the highest layer.
In phase 3, the HARM generated for the IoT network (including attack paths) is
visualised in the form of an AG in the upper layer and middle layer, respectively,
and a set of ATs in the lower layer.
In phase 4, the security analysis is carried out for the IoT network. The attack
path information or other information (e.g., a set of nodes or vulnerabilities) is
taken as an input into the Security Evaluator along with the determined security
metrics. Based on the metrics, the Security Evaluator can perform one of two
options. One option is to output the analysis results directly and the other option
is to generate a textual input file and export the file into the SHARPE which
computes the security analysis results. The description and calculation of security
metrics are presented in Section 3.2.2.
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In specific, the SHARPE [121] is a software package for performance and
reliability analysis of computer systems. It accepts a mathematical model of
the system and analyses it using various algorithms. Several model types are
provided, for example, Markov chains, Semi-Markov chains, reliability block
diagrams, fault trees and reliability graphs. Each model type supports at least
one analysis algorithm; for example, fault trees have five analysis algorithms
including reliability, unreliability, mean-time-to-failure, etc. Given the behaviour
of the components of a system in the form of time-dependent functions and the
structure of the system in the form of a model type, the SHARPE can compute
the behaviour of the system as a function of time which is used for performance
and reliability analysis.
In phase 5, any changes caused by the defence mechanisms are captured
to update model inputs. Based on the security analysis results, the security
decision maker knows which part of the IoT is the most vulnerable, thus being
able to decide proper defence mechanisms. The deployment of a defence
mechanism changes either the vulnerability information (e.g., eliminates a
specific vulnerability in an IoT node or mitigates the effect caused by the
vulnerability) or the topology information (e.g., IoT node removal or addition),
which is updated and taken as the input into the IoT Generator. The previous
phases are carried out again to re-analyse the security of the network after
the deployment of the defence mechanism. When choosing the defence
mechanisms, the security decision maker can also assess the effectiveness of
different mechanisms via the framework by using security metrics and comparing
their effects.
3.2.2 Framework Formulation
We formally describe the framework in terms of the network, subnet, node and
vulnerability information, and then define the three-layered HARM.
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3.2.2.1 General Notations
An IoT network has three major attributes, which are a finite set of subnets S, a
finite set of IoT nodes T, and a finite set of vulnerabilities V. We denote a subnet
as s∈S, a node as t∈T and a vulnerability as v∈V . For one target, the attacker
may be able to find multiple attack paths to reach it via one or multiple entry
points. Thus we consider a set of all attack paths AP for reaching a given target
or multiple targets. Each attack path ap∈AP is a sequence of nodes and each
node in the path has one or more vulnerabilities. The notations and definitions of
security metrics used in the framework are listed in Table 3.1.
We also define two metrics for analysing the node and network properties in the
following. These metrics will be used to analyse the impact of a routing attack in
the smart home scenario in Section 3.3.1.
• Node degree (dt): degree of a single node t
• Average node connectivity (ANC): average of local node connectivity over
all pairs of nodes in the network
The attributes of an IoT network IoT = (S, T , V ) are shown as follows:
• Each subnet s∈S has a name sname, a set of IoT nodes snodes⊆T , a topology
information stopo∈{tree, mesh, ...}, and a set of adjacent subnets sad j⊆S
according to the network structure.
• Each node t∈T has a name tname, a type ttype∈{Smart TV (Samsung),
Tablet (Android), ...}, a mobility information tmobility∈{static, mobile},
a set of adjacent nodes tad j⊆T according to the network structure, a set of
vulnerabilities tvuls⊆V , and a set of security metrics tmetrics⊆{dt , aspt , act ,
aimt , mttct , rt , roat}.
• Each vulnerability v∈V has a name vname, a privilege level that is
acquired by the attacker after the vulnerability is successfully exploited
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vprivilege∈{root, user, ...}, and a set of security metrics vmetrics⊆{aspv, acv,
aimv, crv, rv, roav}.
3.2.2.2 Security Model Definition
We define the three-layered HARM based on the HARM [59]. The three-
layered HARM has upper, middle and lower layers. The upper layer model
(an AG) represents the subnet connectivity information and the attackers’ entry
points, the middle layer model (an AG) captures the network reachability
information and the attackers’ entry points, and the lower layer model (a set
of ATs) depicts the vulnerability information of each node (if the node has
vulnerabilities) and an attack goal achieved by the attackers by exploiting one
or multiple vulnerabilities.
Definition 1. The three-layered HARM of an IoT network IoT = (S, T , V ) is
defined as a 5-tuple GSM = (U , M, L, CU,M, CM,L). Here, U is an AG model for
S (the upper layer), M is an AG model for T (the middle layer) and L is a set
of AT models for V (the lower layer). The relationship between components in
the upper and middle layers is described by CU,M = {(s, t) | s∈S and t∈snodes} ⊆
S×T . Each node that has one or more vulnerabilities has a corresponding AT in
the lower layer; the partial mapping CM,L : T→L gives the associated AT.
Definition 2. An AG is defined as a directed graph ag = (N,E) where N is a
finite set of components and E⊆N×N is a set of edges between components. Let
k be the subnet including one or multiple attackers where k/∈S and knodes ∩ T =
/0. The representations of U and M are as follows:
• U : N⊆S∪{k} and E⊆(S∪{k})×S
• M: N⊆T∪knodes and E⊆(T∪knodes)×T .
The restrictions on the edges imply that there are no edges into the attacker subnet
or its nodes.
Definition 3. An AT is defined as a 5-tuple at = (A,B,c,g,root). Here, A is
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a set of components which are the leaves of at and B is a set of gates which are
the inner nodes of at. We require A∩B = /0 and root∈A∪B. Let P(X) denote
the power set of X . The function c : B→P(A∪B) describes the children of each
inner node in at (we assume there are no cycles). The function g : B→{AND,OR}
describes the type of each gate. The representation of the attack tree att associated
to the node t∈T is as follows:
• att : A⊆tvuls.
This means that the vulnerabilities of a node are combined using logical AND
and OR gates.
3.2.2.3 Calculation of Security Metrics
The security metrics, shown in Table 3.1, are divided into four levels, which
are the network, attack path, node and vulnerability levels. The values of some
metrics in higher levels are calculated from lower levels in the security analysis
phase. This is done for attack success probability, attack cost, attack impact,
mean-time-to-compromise, risk and return-on-attacks [28, 84]. For example,
values in the network level are calculated from values in the attack path, node
and vulnerability levels. The value of the attack success probability is in the
range of zero to one, while the value of acv and aimv is in the range of zero to ten.
Take the attack success probability as an example. The larger the value is within
the range, the higher the probability is for an attacker to exploit the vulnerability.
By introducing the value range, we use standardised metric values as it is not easy
to get the exact values of the security metrics from the real-world scenarios. The
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [45] uses a similar way to assess
the severity of vulnerabilities.
We calculate the attack cost, attack impact, risk, return-on-attacks and
mean-attack-path-length using the Security Evaluator. For the attack success
probability and mean-time-to-compromise, we use the Security Evaluator and the
SHARPE. In the following calculations, for each node t∈T that has an attack tree
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att = (A,B,c,g,root), we assign values to aspv, acv, aimv and crv for each v ∈ A
based on the CVSS and existing research papers that analyse the vulnerabilities.
Attack success probability: attack success probability is used to measure the
probability of an attacker to successfully achieve an attack goal. At the node level,
the metric is the probability for an attacker to compromise the node. At first, we
calculate the attack success probability values for each inner node of an attack
tree by Equation (3.1). Then the attack success probability value of a node t∈T
is the attack success probability value of the root of the corresponding attack tree
by Equation (3.2). At the path level, the metric is the probability for an attacker
to compromise the target via the attack path. The attack success probability value
of an attack path is calculated by Equation (3.3). At the network level, the metric
is the probability for an attacker to compromise the target via all potential paths.










aspt = asproot (3.2)
aspap = ∏
t∈ap
aspt , ap ∈ AP (3.3)
In Algorithm 1, we use the reliability graph model in the SHARPE to calculate
the probability that there is no attack path from the attacker to the target and then
use 1 minus that probability to calculate ASP. Specifically, the SHARPE analyses
the reliability graph using the factoring algorithm [121]. After factoring, if the
sub-graph becomes series-parallel, its analysis can be done using Equation (3.4)
where F is the distribution function of time variable i and J is the number of
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Algorithm 1: Calculation of ASP
Data: AP and aspt (t ∈ ap)
Result: ASP
1 begin
2 H← {t | t∈ap for some ap∈AP}
3 Construct a directed graph graph with node set H
4 for each attack path (t1, ..., tn)∈AP do
5 for each i∈{2, ...,n} do





nodes included in the structure.
F(i) =
 1−∏Jj=1[1−Fj(i)], for a series structure
∏
J
j=1Fj(i), for a parallel structure
(3.4)
Attack cost: attack cost is used to measure the cost spent by an attacker to
successfully achieve an attack goal. At the node level, the metric is the cost spent
by an attacker to compromise a node. Attack cost values for each inner node of an
attack tree and each node t∈T are calculated by Equations (3.5) and (3.6). At the
path level, the metric is the cost spent by an attacker to compromise the target via
the attack path. The attack cost value of an attack path is calculated by Equation
(3.7). At the network level, the metric is the minimum cost spent by an attacker
to compromise the target among all potential paths. The network-level value AC
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act = acroot (3.6)
acap = ∑
t∈ap




Attack impact: attack impact is used to compute the potential loss caused
by an attacker to successfully achieve an attack goal. The potential loss is the
loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability. At the node level, the metric is
the loss caused by an attacker to compromise a node. Attack impact values for
each inner node of an attack tree and each node t∈T are calculated by Equations
(3.9) and (3.10). At the path level, the metric is the loss caused by an attacker to
compromise the target via the attack path. The attack impact value of an attack
path is calculated by Equation (3.11). In the network level, the metric is the
maximum loss caused by an attacker to compromise the target among all potential










aimt = aimroot (3.10)
aimap = ∑
t∈ap




Mean-time-to-compromise: mean-time-to-compromise is used to measure
the mean time for an attacker to successfully achieve an attack goal. At the node
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level, the metric is the mean time for an attacker to compromise a node. If the
node has only one vulnerability, which means the AT contains just one node with
a compromise rate crroot , we obtain the mean-time-to-compromise value mttct by
Equation (3.13). If the node has more than one vulnerability, which means the
AT has more than one node, we use Algorithm 2.
mttct = 1/crroot (3.13)
Algorithm 2: Calculation of mttct
Data: att and crv (v ∈ A)
Result: mttct
1 begin
2 Create a tree tree with structure att and values crv as leaves
3 mttct ← CalculateMean(tree)
4 end
In Algorithm 2, we use the fault tree model in the SHARPE to calculate the
mean-time-to-compromise. Specifically, the SHARPE analyses the fault tree with
repeated components using the factoring algorithm [121]. After factoring, if the
sub-tree has no repeated components, its analysis can be done using Equation
(3.14) where F is the distribution function of time variable i and J is the number
of nodes included in the structure.
F(i) =
 ∏Jj=1Fj(i), for AND gate1−∏Jj=1[1−Fj(i)], for OR gate (3.14)
At the path level, the metric is the mean time for an attacker to compromise the
target via the attack path. We calculate mttcap by Equation (3.15). At the network
level, the metric is the minimum mean time for an attacker to compromise the
target among all potential attack paths. We calculate MTTC by Equation (3.16).
mttcap = ∑
t∈ap
mttct , ap ∈ AP (3.15)
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MT TC = min
ap∈AP
mttcap (3.16)
Risk: risk is used to compute the potential harm caused by an attacker to
successfully achieve an attack goal. At the vulnerability level, the metric is
the harm caused by an attacker to exploit a vulnerability and calculated from
the attack success probability value times the attack impact value. For each
vulnerability v∈A, the risk value is calculated by Equation (3.17). At the node
level, the metric is the harm caused by an attacker to compromise a node. Risk
values for each inner node of an attack tree and each node t∈T are calculated
by Equations (3.18) and (3.19). At the path level, the metric is the harm caused
by an attacker to compromise the target via the attack path. The risk value of
an attack path is calculated by Equation (3.20). In the network level, the metric
is the maximum harm caused by an attacker to compromise the target among all
potential paths. The network-level value R is thus given by (3.21).










rt = rroot (3.19)
rap = ∑
t∈ap




Return-on-attacks: return-on-attacks is used to compute the potential gain on
an attacker’s effort to successfully achieve an attack goal. At the vulnerability
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level, the metric is the gain on an attacker’s effort to exploit a vulnerability
and calculated from the risk value divided by the attack cost value. For each
vulnerability v∈A, the return-on-attacks value is calculated by Equation (3.22).
At the node level, the metric is the gain on an attacker’s effort to compromise
a node. Return-on-attacks values for each inner node of an attack tree and each
node t∈T are calculated by Equations (3.23) and (3.24). At the path level, the
metric is the gain on an attacker’s effort to compromise the target via the attack
path. The return-on-attacks value of an attack path is calculated by Equation
(3.25). In the network level, the metric is the maximum gain on an attacker’s
effort to compromise the target among all potential paths. The network-level
value ROA is thus given by (3.26).










roat = roaroot (3.24)
roaap = ∑
t∈ap




Number of attack paths: number of attack paths is used to compute the
potential paths for an attacker to successfully reach the target and calculated in
the network level (i.e., the middle layer of the three-layered HARM) by Equation
(3.27).
NAP = |AP| (3.27)
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Mean-attack-path-length: mean-attack-path-length is used to compute the
expected effort for an attacker to successfully reach the target and calculated in
the network level (i.e., the middle layer of the three-layered HARM). The mean-







3.3 Evaluation of the Framework
The IoT has been widely applied in various fields, including healthcare,
transport, environment monitoring, etc. We use three example networks in three
different scenarios to show the feasibility and scalability of the framework. They
are the home network in a smart home, the wireless body area network in the
wearable healthcare monitoring scenario and the wireless sensor network for
environment monitoring. Any example networks in other scenarios can also be
used to evaluate the framework.
3.3.1 Sinkhole Attack in Smart Home
A smart home is one of the application domains of the emerging IoT. It
has come into thousands of families and brought new technologies to people’s
lives [53]. Unfortunately, it also provides a platform for attackers to hack into
the home network and remotely control home systems. As many IoT devices are
resource-constrained, standard security solutions may not be implemented. IoT
devices can become entry points into the smart home and can then be exploited to
leak sensitive information [145]. Thus the smart home environment is exposed to
various threats. With an increasing number of Internet-connected devices in the
house, vulnerabilities and related threats also increase. We describe the attack
scenarios in the smart home and show the benefits of the framework via a use
case.
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3.3.1.1 Scenario Description
A smart home is formed by a number of home automation systems, which can
autonomously operate devices and thus control the home on behalf of users [67].
ZigBee technology, an IEEE 802.15.4-based specification [72], is designed
to be used by applications that require low data rate, low cost, low power
consumption and two-way wireless communications. Some examples are home
appliances (e.g., air conditioners, refrigerators, and washing machines), lighting
control (e.g., light bulbs), environment monitoring (e.g., temperature, humidity)
and security (e.g., smart door lock, surveillance camera).
The Wi-Fi standard has been widely established as the wireless home
networking technology. It is designed to provide relatively high data rate
communications. It can be used for multimedia applications of digital products
in the home network (smartphones, smart TVs, tablets, etc).
3.3.1.2 System Model
We consider the IoT-enabled home network shown in Figure 3.2 as an example.
The home network is a heterogeneous network with devices using different
operating systems, applications and communication protocols. It includes a
ZigBee network and a Wi-Fi network. As ZigBee and Wi-Fi can coexist with
less interference problems than alternative technologies, the combination of
them has the potential to provide comprehensive home network solutions [51].
A smart home automation hub is used to support Wi-Fi, ZigBee and Internet
communications. Specifically, the integrated hub is able to establish a ZigBee
network that allows home devices to communicate with each other by using
the ZigBee wireless protocol; it provides the Internet connection for the ZigBee
network and the Wi-Fi network; it also provides a user interface control panel
so that users can connect to the hub through the Internet to get access to ZigBee
devices and remotely control them [34].
The ZigBee network contains heterogeneous sensors [37, 71]. Our use case
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Figure 3.2: A smart home scenario.
has a number of ZigBee devices presented in the emulated environment in [37],
such as electricity meters, thermostats, temperature and humidity measurement
sensors. ZigBee devices communicate wirelessly to the hub (acting as the
coordinator) in the form of a mesh topology. Some devices act as routers to
extend the limited range of the network (e.g., the electricity meter). They can
transfer packets to/from other ZigBee devices. Some devices are end devices
thus only interacting with a router or the hub (e.g., thermostat, temperature and
humidity measurement sensor).
We use an Android tablet equipped with a ZigBee chip. It connects to both the
Wi-Fi network and the ZigBee network and acts as a ZigBee router in the ZigBee
network. We also use a Smart TV which connects to the Wi-Fi network. Both of
them get access to the Internet through the smart home hub.
3.3.1.3 Attacker Model
We assume the attacker’s goal is to lure the traffic from the smart home hub
through a compromised device as the ZigBee routing algorithm is prone to
Sinkhole attacks [37]. The assumptions about the attacker’s ability are listed
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in the following.
1. The attacker is able to remotely compromise the Smart TV. In the
literature, there are several papers addressing remote attacks on smart
TVs [20, 98]. According to the practical proof-of-concept attacks or
experiments introduced in the papers, the attackers can remotely exploit
software vulnerabilities on a smart TV without physical proximity to the
target and gain control over it. Then they can use it as a gateway to exploit
vulnerabilities in any other devices inside the home (e.g., the tablet).
2. The attacker is able to compromise the Android tablet with a specific
malware exploiting several bugs in the software and the operating
system [37]. After the tablet is compromised, the attacker can use the tablet
to launch other attacks targeting the ZigBee network. We use the Sinkhole
attack as an example of a further attack as the ZigBee routing algorithm is
prone to the Sinkhole attack. The attacker is able to use a malicious device
(i.e., the Android tablet) to advertise false routing table stating a shorter
route to the hub, thus luring traffic of some ZigBee home devices from the
hub to the malicious device.
Specifically, we use the attacks introduced in [37, 98]. For the smart TV,
the attacker can construct a malicious media file by using FFmpeg to find
exploitable vulnerabilities in supported media formats and upload the file on
the Internet. After the victim downloads the malicious file and starts to play
back the video file, the TV is compromised. We assume FFmpeg 5.0 is used
by the TV. Two vulnerabilities are found in two types of media file formats
supported by FFmpeg and the attacker can exploit any one of them to run
arbitrary code and gain the root privilege of the TV. The information about the
two vulnerabilities in the CVE and their CVSS base scores are summarised in
Table 3.2. For the Android tablet, the attacker can write a malware to get the
root permission and change the transmission power of the ZigBee chip integrated
in the device. The malware was developed based on a malfunctional Trojan,
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Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad.a. According to [138], it exploits three bugs: firstly,
an error in the DEX2JAR software was used to disrupt the conversion of Dalvik
bytecode into Java bytecode, which complicates the statistical analysis of the
Trojan; secondly, an error in the Android operating system was used to modify
the AndroidManifest.xml file, which makes a dynamic analysis of the Trojan
extremely hard; thirdly, a previously unknown error in the Android operating
system was used to obtain the extended Device Administrator privileges without
appearing on the list of applications which have such privileges, which makes the
detection impossible.
Table 3.2: Vulnerability information in the TV.
CVE ID CVSS Base score Impact Exploitability
CVE-2008-4866 10.0 10.0 10.0
CVE-2009-0385 9.3 10.0 8.6
3.3.1.4 Data Processing
As the devices in the home network use Wi-Fi and ZigBee communication
protocols, we introduce two subnets to differentiate heterogeneous devices based
on our classification method. The subnets are denoted as swifi and szigbee
respectively. In the ZigBee network, we use 5 devices acting as routers and 3 end
devices attached to each router. ZigBee routers are denoted as tri (i∈ {1,2, ...,5})
and ZigBee end devices are denoted as te j ( j ∈ {1,2, ...,15}). The smart home
hub denoted as thub and an Android tablet denoted as ttab belong to both ZigBee
network and Wi-Fi network. The Wi-Fi network also includes a TV denoted as
ttv. In the IoT Generator, the IoT network is represented as IoT1 = (S1, T1, V1)
where S1={swi f i,szigbee}, T1={thub, ttv, ttab, tr1, ..., tr5, te1, ..., te15} and V1={vtv1,
vtv2, vtab1, vtab2, vtab3}. Here, vtv1 and vtv2 refer to two vulnerabilities found in
two types of media file formats in the TV, namely CVE-2008-4866 and CVE-
2009-0385 in Table 3.2. Three software bugs in the tablet are denoted as vtab1,
vtab2 and vtab3.
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We show the full list of attributes for a subnet szigbee, a node ttv and a
vulnerability vtv1 as examples in the following.
• szigbeename = zigbee
• szigbeenodes = {ttab, tr1, ..., tr5, te1, ..., te15}
• szigbeetopo = mesh
• szigbeead j = {swifi}
• ttvname = tv
• ttvtype = Smart TV (Samsung)
• ttvmobility = static
• ttvad j = {thub, ttab}
• ttvvuls = {vtv1, vtv2}
• ttvmetrics = {dttv , aspttv , acttv , aimttv , mttcttv , rttv , roattv}
• vtv1name = CVE-2008-4866
• vtv1privilege = root
• vtv1metrics = {aspvtv1 , acvtv1 , aimvtv1 , crvtv1 , rvtv1 , roavtv1}
We choose the following security metrics to be used in the security analysis
phase: attack success probability, attack cost, attack impact, mean-time-to-
compromise, risk and return-on-attacks. Based on the vulnerabilities described in
Section 3.3.1.3, we make assumptions about the metric values of vulnerabilities
in the TV and the Android tablet and show the values in Table 3.3. For the
values of vulnerabilities in the TV, we extract the values of attack impact and
attack success probability from the impact and exploitability scores in Table 3.2
respectively, and estimate the values of the other two security metrics from the
CVSS base scores. Both vtv1 and vtv2 allow an attacker to exploit from the Internet
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without any authentication. Both vulnerabilities do not require special tools by
the attacker. A laptop-class device with a Linux-based operating system and
hacking software would be sufficient. Therefore we use low attack cost for vtv1
and vtv2. The compromise rate indicates the frequency that the vulnerability can
be exploited successfully. We estimate the compromise rate as once per week
as the victim may download the video files at weekends and accidentally get a
malicious one.
For the metric values of vulnerabilities in the Android tablet, we can estimate
the values based on the descriptions as no CVSS scores are available. All
three vulnerabilities in the tablet allow an attacker to exploit from the Internet
without any authentication. There is no need for special tools used by the
attacker to exploit vulnerabilities. We assume low access complexity as the
attacker can easily gain the knowledge of the Android operating system. Thus
we use low attack cost and high attack success probability. As people might
use their tablets every day and accidentally download the malware, we assume
the compromise rate as twice per week. Vulnerabilities vtab1 and vtab2 can be
exploited to complicate the analysis of the Trojan, which are assumed to have low
attack impact (i.e., partial impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability).
Vulnerability vtab3 is used to obtain the extended privileges which is assumed to
have the maximum attack impact.
Table 3.3: Metric values for each vulnerability in the home network.
Vulnerability
Metric
aspv acv aimv crv
vtv1 1.0 3.0 10.0 0.006
vtv2 0.86 3.0 10.0 0.006
vtab1 0.8 3.0 4.0 0.012
vtab2 0.8 3.0 4.0 0.012
vtab3 0.8 3.0 10.0 0.012
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3.3.1.5 Security Model Generation and Visualisation
We use IoT1 = (S1,T1,V1) as the input into the Security Model Generator and
compute the three-layered HARM. The model is represented as GSM1 = (U1, M1,
L1, CU1,M1 , CM1,L1).
As an example of an attack graph, we show U1=({k, szigbee, swifi}, {k→swifi,
swifi→szigbee}).
As an example of an attack tree, we show atttv=({vtv1, vtv2}, {roottv},
c(roottv)={vtv1, vtv2}, g(roottv)=OR, roottv).
We use two subnets in the upper layer of the model to represent szigbee and swifi.
Figure 3.3 shows the visualised attack path in the network captured by the model.
By exploiting the vulnerabilities, the attacker is able to bypass the smart home
hub and break into the home network via the smart TV.
Figure 3.3: Attack paths in the home network.
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3.3.1.6 Security Analysis and Model Updates
In the Sinkhole attack, more devices choose the malicious tablet to route their
data to the smart home hub as the compromised tablet represents a shorter route
to the hub with the increased power and increased probability of successfully
delivering the packets [37]. We assume the compromised tablet refuses to deliver
any packets to/from the hub. Thus we analyse the impact of the attack using
the average node connectivity of the network (ANC1) and the degree of the hub
and the tablet (dthub and dttab) shown in Table 3.4. In our example network,
under the Sinkhole attack, the average node connectivity drops as the malicious
tablet disconnects with the hub and the TV which partitions the network into
two separate parts; the degree of the hub decreases while the degree of the tablet
increases as some routers and end devices cut off their initial connections and
connect to the tablet because of its higher transmission power.




Before the attack 1.1146 4 2
After the attack 1.1028 3 10
As there is only one attack path ap=(ttv, ttab) in the network, we calculate
values of security metrics in the node and attack path levels. Attack success
probability: we calculate aspttv and aspttab by Equations (3.1) and (3.2), aspap
by Equation (3.3).
aspttv = asproottv = 1− (1−aspvtv1)∗ (1−aspvtv2)
= 1.0− (1.0−1.0)∗ (1.0−0.86) = 1.0
aspttab = asproottab = aspvtab1 ∗aspvtab2 ∗aspvtab3
= 0.8∗0.8∗0.8 = 0.512
aspap = aspttv ∗aspttab = 1.0∗0.512 = 0.512
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Attack cost: we calculate acttv and acttab by Equations (3.5) and (3.6), acap by
Equation (3.7).
acttv = acroottv = min(acvtv1,acvtv2)
= min(3.0,3.0) = 3.0
acttab = acroottab = acvtab1 +acvtab2 +acvtab3
= 3.0+3.0+3.0 = 9.0
acap = acttv +acttab = 3.0+9.0 = 12.0
Attack impact: we calculate aimttv and aimttab by Equations (3.9) and (3.10),
aimap by Equation (3.11).
aimttv = aimroottv = max(aimvtv1,aimvtv2)
= max(10.0,10.0) = 10.0
aimttab = aimroottab = aimvtab1 +aimvtab2 +aimvtab3
= 4.0+4.0+10.0 = 18.0
aimap = aimttv +aimttab = 10.0+18.0 = 28.0
Mean-time-to-compromise: we use Algorithm 2 to calculate mttcttv and
mttcttab . The SHARPE outputs are shown in the following: mttcttv = 83.33 and
mttcttab = 152.78. We also calculate mttcap by Equation (3.15).
mttcap = mttcttv +mttcttab = 83.33+152.78≈ 236.11
Risk: we calculate rvtv1 , rvtv2 , rvtab1 , rvtab2 and rvtab3 by Equation (3.17), rttv and
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rttab by Equations (3.18) and (3.19), rap by Equation (3.20).
rvtv1 = aspvtv1 ∗aimvtv1 = 1.0∗10.0 = 10.0
rvtv2 = aspvtv2 ∗aimvtv2 = 0.86∗10.0 = 8.6
rvtab1 = aspvtab1 ∗aimvtab1 = 0.8∗4.0 = 3.2
rvtab2 = aspvtab2 ∗aimvtab2 = 0.8∗4.0 = 3.2
rvtab3 = aspvtab3 ∗aimvtab3 = 0.8∗10.0 = 8.0
rttv = rroottv = max(rvtv1,rvtv2) = max(10.0,8.6) = 10.0
rttab = rroottab = rvtab1 + rvtab2 + rvtab3 = 3.2+3.2+8.0 = 14.4
rap = rttv + rttab = 10.0+14.4 = 24.4
Return-on-attacks: we calculate roavtv1 , roavtv2 , roavtab1 , roavtab2 and roavtab3
by Equation (3.22), roattv and roattab by Equations (3.23) and (3.24), roaap by
Equation (3.25).
roavtv1 = rvtv1/acvtv1 = 10.0/3.0≈ 3.33
roavtv2 = rvtv2/acvtv2 = 8.6/3.0≈ 2.87
roavtab1 = rvtab1/acvtab1 = 3.2/3.0≈ 1.07
roavtab2 = rvtab2/acvtab2 = 3.2/3.0≈ 1.07
roavtab3 = rvtab3/acvtab3 = 0.8/3.0≈ 2.67
roattv = roaroottv = max(roavtv1,roavtv2)
= max(3.33,2.87) = 3.33
roattab = roaroottab = roavtab1 + roavtab2 + roavtab3
= 1.07+1.07+2.67≈ 4.81
roaap = roattv + roattab = 3.33+4.81≈ 8.14
From the metric values in the node level, we can see that attacking the TV has
higher success probability, lower cost and mean-time-to-compromise but lower
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impact, risk and return-on-attacks than attacking the tablet because the attacker
can exploit either vulnerability in TV to gain the root permission but needs to
exploit all vulnerabilities in the tablet for the root permission. Thus the TV is
easier to compromise. Besides, as the TV is also the entry point, we should
protect the TV at first in order to prevent the attacker from breaking into the
network or to make the attacker harder to break in.
We assume patching is used to fix the software bug existing in the TV. One
mechanism is to patch vtv1 and denoted as Defencevtv1 while another is to patch
vtv2 and denoted as Defencevtv2 . We modify the vulnerability information for
the TV, reconstruct the IoT network using the IoT Generator, compute the three-
layered HARM and calculate the metric values after patching either vtv1 or vtv2.
The results calculated in the security analysis phase are shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Security analysis of the home network.
Mechanism
Metric
aspap acap aimap mttcap rap roaap
No defence 0.51 12.0 28.0 236.11 24.4 8.14
Defencevtv1 0.44 12.0 28.0 319.44 23.0 7.67
Defencevtv2 0.51 12.0 28.0 319.44 24.4 8.14
For both Defencevtv1 and Defencevtv2 , mttcap increases, which means both
mechanisms are effective to extend the mean-time-to-compromise, while acap
and aimap do not change as the attack cost and impact values of vtv1 and
vtv2 are the same respectively. For aspap, as exploiting vtv1 has higher
success probability than exploiting vtv2, deploying Defencevtv1 decreases the
attack success probability more than deploying Defencevtv2 . For rap and roaap,
deploying Defencevtv1 causes lower risk and less gain than deploying Defencevtv2 .
If the defender is only able to deploy one mechanism to protect the TV (e.g., the
manufacturer can only create one patch due to time and cost), Defencevtv1 should
be chosen as it is more effective in reducing the attack success probability, risk
and attacker’s gain.
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3.3.1.7 Summary
Using the framework, one can find potential attack paths, decide which devices
included in the paths should be protected at first and compare the effectiveness of
different device-level mechanisms based on the evaluation of various security
metrics. As a result, one can choose the most effective device-level defence
mechanisms for specific devices.
3.3.2 Node Controlling in Wearable Healthcare Monitoring
The emerging IoT has provided many benefits to the improvement of e-health
applications. One application is the vital sign monitoring in hospitals [73], which
uses wireless sensing technology to provide continuous monitoring for patients.
As the data collected from the patients is sensitive, security threats may put a
patient into a critical condition (e.g., lack of treatment or wrong treatment).
3.3.2.1 Scenario Description
We consider the wireless body area network (WBAN) which has been widely
applied in wearable healthcare monitoring. It allows the vital physiological
parameters of patients to be collected by wearable or implantable sensors and
transmitted using short-range wireless communication techniques (e.g., IEEE
802.15.4 [3] or ZigBee [72]). In the WBAN, communications can be divided
into two parts: intra-body and extra-body [79]. The intra-body communication
network transmits data between the monitor sensors placed on the human body
and the coordinator device (which is in charge of collecting data from monitor
sensors and sending it to the external network). The extra-body communication
network transmits data between the coordinator device and an external network
(e.g., the hospital network providing local data processing and remote access via
the Internet).
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3.3.2.2 System Model
We use the intra-body communication in the WBAN in Figure 3.4 as an
example. It shows 9 sensor nodes placed on the human body along with a
coordinator device (e.g., PDA). The network is a heterogeneous network as nodes
have different applications to measure different health data. For example, sensor
node sn1 measures the heart rate and the electrocardiogram (ECG) and sn9 senses
the blood oxygen.
Figure 3.4: An intra-body communication network in the WBAN.
We assume a tree-based routing protocol is used for the intra-body
communication [80] and the network topology does not change. Communications
between sensor nodes and the coordinator device are single-hop or multi-hop.
Data packets are sent to the coordinator device at pre-determined times or
immediately when an emergency event occurs. Each sensor node runs the same
operating system (e.g., TinyOS 2.x) with different applications and has a buffer
overflow vulnerability in the operating system [52]. The coordinator device
receives all information from the sensors and provides an interface towards
the hospital network. A key management scheme is used to protect the data
confidentiality, data integrity and data authentication [129].
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3.3.2.3 Attacker Model
We assume the attacker’s goal is to compromise a sensor node that stores
critical data on it and manipulate the content of the data packets sent from the
node. The attacker model describes the attacker’s capabilities as follows.
1. The attacker is able to get into the hospital. However, as sensors
are deployed on the human body, it is difficult for an attacker to
physically access nodes without being detected. Thus the attacker can only
communicate with the sensor nodes in its radio range.
2. The attacker has a laptop-class device with the radio module to send
malicious packets. He can exploit the buffer overflow vulnerability
targeting the operating system to compromise a sensor node within an
accepted time. Once a node is compromised, the attacker has full control
(e.g., steal cryptographic keys, obtain routing table, inject and run arbitrary
code). He can also reprogram the compromised node into a malicious node
and exploit it to compromise other nodes.
3. The coordinator device is well-protected and only allows the authenticated
sensors to communicate with it such that the attacker cannot easily
compromise the coordinator.
3.3.2.4 Data Processing
Based on our subnet classification method (i.e., the communication protocol),
we introduce one subnet for the whole network as all sensor nodes use the radio
communication. The subnet is denoted as swban which consists of the coordinator
device denoted as tcoord and sensor nodes denoted as tsni (i ∈ {1,2, ...,9}). In
the IoT Generator, the IoT network is represented as IoT2 = (S2, T2, V2) where
S2={swban}, T2={tcoord , tsn1 , ..., tsn9} and V2={vsn}. Here, vsn represents the same
buffer overflow vulnerability on each sensor node.
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We choose the following security metrics to be used in the security analysis
phase: attack success probability, attack cost, attack impact, mean-time-to-
compromise, risk and return-on-attacks. We make assumptions about the metric
values of vulnerability vsn. This vulnerability allows an attacker to exploit within
the communication range of the sensor node without any authentication and has
low access complexity. However, it requires a radio module to communicate with
the sensors. Thus we use high attack success probability and medium attack cost.
After exploiting the vulnerability, the attacker has full control of the sensor node.
Thus we use the maximum attack impact. We also assume the compromise rate
as once per week as the attacker needs to be in the hospital to get access to the
nodes. Estimated values of the security metrics for the vulnerability are shown in
Table 3.6.




aspv acv aimv crv
vsn 0.8 5.0 10.0 0.006
3.3.2.5 Security Model Generation and Visualisation
We use IoT2 = (S2,T2,V2) as the input into the Security Model Generator and
compute the three-layered HARM. The model is represented as GSM2 = (U2, M2,
L2, CU2,M2 , CM2,L2). As an example of an attack graph and an attack tree, we
show U2=({k, swban}, {k→swban}) and attsn1 =({vsn}, {rootsn}, c(rootsn)={vsn},
g(rootsn)=/0, rootsn), respectively.
We assume the attacker’s goal is to compromise sn1 which measures the heart
rate and the ECG information and manipulate the data sent from it to cause
wrong treatment. The attacker is supposed to take either sn4 or sn9 as the
access point by compromising it and exploiting it to compromise other nodes.
Figure 3.5 shows the visualised attack paths in the network. As each node has
the same vulnerability, we show only one vsn in the lower layer. By exploiting
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the vulnerability, the attacker is able to compromise a series of nodes and control
them for malicious purpose.
Figure 3.5: Attack paths in the intra-body communication network.
3.3.2.6 Security Analysis and Model Updates
We calculate the values of security metrics in the node, attack path and network
levels. Network level metrics are denoted as ASP2, AC2, AIM2 and MT TC2. We
define ap1=(tsn9 , tsn4 , tsn1) and ap2=(tsn4 , tsn1).
Attack success probability: as each sensor has only one vulnerability, we
calculate asptsni by Equation (3.2). We also calculate aspap1 and aspap2 by
Equation (3.3). ASP2 is calculated using Algorithm 1 in which the SHARPE
output is 0.74.
asptsni = asprootsni = 0.8
aspap1 = asptsn9 ∗asptsn4 ∗asptsn1 = 0.8∗0.8∗0.8 = 0.512
aspap2 = asptsn4 ∗asptsn1 = 0.8∗0.8 = 0.64
Attack cost: we calculate actsni by Equation (3.6). We also calculate acap1 and
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acap2 by Equation (3.7), AC2 by Equation (3.8).
actsni = acrootsni = 5.0
acap1 = actsn9 +actsn4 +actsn1 = 5.0+5.0+5.0 = 15.0
acap2 = actsn4 +actsn1 = 5.0+5.0 = 10.0
AC2 = min(acap1,acap2) = min(15.0,10.0) = 10.0
Attack impact: we calculate aimtsni by Equation (3.10). We also calculate
aimap1 and aimap2 by Equation (3.11), AIM2 by Equation (3.12).
aimtsni = aimrootsni = 10.0
aimap1 = aimtsn9 +aimtsn4 +aimtsn1 = 10.0+10.0+10.0 = 30.0
aimap2 = aimtsn4 +aimtsn1 = 10.0+10.0 = 20.0
AIM2 = max(aimap1,aimap2) = max(30.0,20.0) = 30.0
Mean-time-to-compromise: we calculate mttcap1and mttcap2 by Equations
(3.13) and (3.15), MT TC2 by Equation (3.16).
mttcap1 = mttctsn9 +mttctsn4 +mttctsn1 = 1/crtsn9 +1/crtsn4 +1/crtsn1
≈ 166.67+166.67+166.67≈ 500.0
mttcap2 = mttctsn4 +mttctsn1 = 1/crtsn4 +1/crtsn1
≈ 166.67+166.67≈ 333.33
MT TC2 = min(mttcap1,mttcap2) = min(500.0,333.33) = 333.33
Risk: we calculate rvsn by Equation (3.17), rtsni by Equation (3.19). We also
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calculate rap1 and rap2 by Equation (3.20), R2 by Equation (3.21).
rvsn = aspvsn ∗aimvsn = 0.8∗10.0 = 8.0
rtsni = rrootsni = rvsn = 8.0
rap1 = rtsn9 + rtsn4 + rtsn1 = 8.0+8.0+8.0 = 24.0
rap2 = rtsn4 + rtsn1 = 8.0+8.0 = 16.0
R2 = max(rap1,rap2) = max(24.0,16.0) = 24.0
Return-on-attacks: we calculate roavsn by Equation (3.22), roatsni by Equation
(3.24). We also calculate roaap1 and roaap2 by Equation (3.25), ROA2 by
Equation (3.26).
roavsn = rvsn/acvsn = 8.0/5.0 = 1.6
roatsni = roarootsni = roavsn = 1.6
roaap1 = roatsn9 + roatsn4 + roatsn1 = 1.6+1.6+1.6 = 4.8
roaap2 = roatsn4 + roatsn1 = 1.6+1.6 = 3.2
ROA2 = max(roaap1,roaap2) = max(4.8,3.2) = 4.8
From the metric values in the attack path level, we can see that exploiting ap2
to reach the target has higher success probability, lower cost and mean-time-to-
compromise but lower impact, risk and return-on-attacks than exploiting ap1 as
there are more nodes in ap1 which need to be compromised by the attacker. Thus
protecting nodes in ap2 is more effective in blocking the attacker to reach the
target.
In terms of the defence mechanism for the buffer overflow, we can deploy the
method of address space layout randomisation (ASLR) for the node, denoted as
DefenceASLR. The ASLR method is based upon the low chance of an attacker
guessing locations of randomly placed areas, thus enhancing the security by
increasing the search space. We make the assumptions on the metric values of
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the vulnerability after deploying the ASLR in Table 3.7. We decrease the attack
success probability and compromise rate as the method can only complicate the
attack but not eliminate the vulnerability. The method does not affect the attack
cost and impact as the tools are the same and the impact measures the potential
loss after the vulnerability is exploited.
Table 3.7: Metric values for the vulnerability in the intra-body communication
network after the deployment of the defence mechanism.
Mechanism
Metric
aspv acv aimv crv
DefenceASLR 0.5 5.0 10.0 0.003
We assume the defender wants to deploy the ASLR defence mechanism on
one device in the attack path ap2 because of the budget limit. We modify the
vulnerability information for each sensor node, reconstruct the IoT network using
the IoT Generator, compute the three-layered HARM and calculate the metric
values. From the metric values in the network level shown in Table 3.8, we can
assess the effectiveness of the mechanism deployed on each node.
Table 3.8: Security analysis of the intra-body communication network.
Mechanism
Metric
ASP2 AC2 AIM2 MT TC2 R2 ROA2
No defence 0.74 10.0 30.0 333.33 24.0 4.8
DefenceASLR on sn4 0.56 10.0 30.0 499.99 21.0 4.2
DefenceASLR on sn1 0.46 10.0 30.0 499.99 21.0 4.2
For DefenceASLR on both sn4 and sn1, ASP2, R2 and ROA2 decrease while
MT TC2 increases. ASP2 is lower when using the ASLR on sn1 since sn4 and
sn1 have different locations in the network. AC2 and AIM2 do not change as the
metric values do not change before and after the defence mechanism. Thus, based
on the analysis results, we can see that protecting sn1 is more effective against
the attack.
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3.3.2.7 Summary
Using the framework, one can compare the severity of multiple potential attack
paths and the effectiveness of specific device-level mechanisms deployed for
different devices. This helps to decide which devices should be protected at first.
3.3.3 Traffic Analysis in Environment Monitoring
Among the IoT application domains, the habitat and environment monitoring
has received a growing interest as it is essential for studying and making efficient
use of our environment. As the first step of the analysis, sensor networks are used
to collect data from the environment. As sensor networks are usually deployed
in an open field with little human interaction, they are prone to failures due to
extreme climatic conditions or various malicious attacks.
3.3.3.1 Scenario Description
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been widely used in the IoT
environment monitoring applications as the WSNs are well-suited for long-term
environmental sensing for the IoT applications. With the WSNs, environmental
monitoring includes both indoor and outdoor applications [81]. One outdoor
application is the habitat monitoring which requires a large number of low-
cost sensor nodes and a gateway node (i.e., the sink) deployed in a given
landscape. Sensor nodes are responsible for data acquisition while the gateway
node connects to the remote servers via the Internet.
3.3.3.2 System Model
We consider a WSN with 1000 sensor nodes and one sink deployed in an open
and unattended field shown in Figure 3.6. The network is a homogeneous network
as each sensor node has the same application for sensing the temperature and
humidity of the environment.
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Figure 3.6: A wireless sensor network.
We assume sensor nodes and the sink are static after deployment. Sensor
nodes self-organise and form a routing tree which is rooted at the sink [140].
Each sensor has a transmission range of r meters and uses bidirectional wireless
communication. Communications between the sink and sensor nodes are single-
hop or multi-hop. Sensor nodes periodically send packets to the sink (e.g.,
every 10 minutes). Data packets are encrypted by employing a pair-wise key
scheme [44]. The sink is connected to the Internet and becomes the gateway
between the sensor network and the Internet.
3.3.3.3 Attacker Model
We assume the attacker’s goal is to destroy the sink physically after finding its
location. As the sink is the central point of failure, destroying it will make the
whole network unavailable for sending data to the remote servers. The attacker
model is based on [41] which describes the attacker’s capabilities as follows.
1. In the wireless communication, radio links are insecure. We assume an
attacker can eavesdrop on radio transmissions by distributing a wireless
monitoring device in the area of interest. The transmission range of the
monitoring device is larger than the transmission range of a sensor node
(e.g., 3r meters) but does not cover the entire network.
2. The attacker can physically move from one location to another location in
the network but cannot monitor the entire network.
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3. Each node routes packets along a fixed path to the sink using wireless
communication. Thus the attacker can launch a rate-monitoring attack to
deduce the location of the sink by monitoring the packet sending rate of
nodes and moving towards the nodes with higher rates.
4. As the sink is in an open environment, the attacker can physically damage
it once he discovers its location.
3.3.3.4 Data Processing
As all sensor nodes in the network are identical, we introduce one subnet for
the whole network, denoted as swsn. According to the attacker’s capabilities
in Section 3.3.3.3, we denote the vulnerability of the sensor node described in
capability 3 as vsn and the vulnerability of the sink described in capability 4 as
vsink. In the IoT Generator, the IoT network is represented as IoT3 = (S3, T3, V3)
where S3={swsn}, T2={tsink, tsn1 , ..., tsn1000} and V3={vsn, vsink}.
We choose the following security metrics to be used in the security analysis
phase: attack success probability, attack cost, attack impact, mean-time-to-
compromise, risk, return-on-attacks and number of attack paths. We make
assumptions about the metric values of the vulnerabilities. For vsn, sensor nodes
are deployed in an open field, thus allowing easy access to them. However, an
attacker needs to purchase and distribute a special device to monitor the packet
sending rate. Thus we use high attack success probability and high attack cost.
By using the vulnerability, the attacker may be able to discover the position of
the base station. We assume a medium attack impact. For vsink, as the sink is
deployed in an open field, the attacker can easily damage it physically once he
knows the location. So we use high attack success probability and medium attack
cost respectively. Once the sink is damaged, the data gathered from sensor nodes
cannot be delivered to remote servers. Thus we use the maximum attack impact.
Besides, for both vsn and vsink, we use a compromise rate of once per week as the
sensor network is deployed in remote areas and it is not easy for an attacker to
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get to the areas. The estimated values for security metrics of the vulnerabilities
are shown in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9: Metric values for each vulnerability in the WSN.
Vulnerability
Metric
aspv acv aimv crv
vsn 0.9 8.0 4.0 0.006
vsink 0.9 5.0 10.0 0.006
3.3.3.5 Security Model Generation and Visualisation
We use IoT3 = (S3,T3,V3) as the input into the Security Model Generator and
compute the three-layered HARM. The model is represented as GSM3 = (U3,
M3, L3, CU3,M3 , CM3,L3). As an example of an attack graph and an attack tree,
we show U3=({k, swsn}, {k→swsn}) and attsn1 =({vsn}, {rootsn}, c(rootsn)={vsn},
g(rootsn)=/0, rootsn), respectively.
The attacker is assumed to access one sensor node (e.g., sn999 deployed at the
edge of the network). Figure 3.7 shows the visualised attack path in the network.
As each sensor has the same vulnerability, we show only one vsn in the lower
layer. By exploiting the vulnerabilities, the attacker is able to move along the
nodes with a higher packet sending rate and discover the location of the sink.
3.3.3.6 Security Analysis and Model Updates
As each node (i.e., a sensor node or the sink) has only one vulnerability which
can be exploited by the attacker, metric values in the vulnerability level equal to
the values in the node level. There is only one attack path captured in the HARM.
Thus NAP = 1. We list the nodes in the attack path as ap=(tsn999 , tsn499 , tsn249 , tsn124 ,
tsn61 , tsn30 , tsn14 , tsn6 , tsn2 , tsink).
Attack success probability: we calculate ASP3 using Algorithm 1 in which
the SHARPE output is approximately 0.35.
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Figure 3.7: Attack path in the WSN.
Attack cost: we calculate AC3 by Equations (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8).
AC3 = acap = actsn999 +actsn499 + ...+actsink
= acrootsn999 +acrootsn499 + ...+acrootsink = 77.0
Attack impact: we calculate AIM3 by Equations (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12).
AIM3 = aimap = aimtsn999 +aimtsn499 + ...+aimtsink
= aimrootsn999 +aimrootsn499 + ...+aimrootsink = 46.0
Mean-time-to-compromise: we calculate MTTC3 by Equations (3.13), (3.15)
and (3.16).
MT TC3 = mttcap = mttctsn999 +mttctsn499 + ...+mttctsink
= 1/crtsn999 +1/crtsn499 + ...+1/crtsink ≈ 1666.66
Risk: we calculate rvsn and rvsink by Equation (3.17), R3 by Equations (3.19),
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(3.20) and (3.21).
rvsn = aspvsn ∗aimvsn = 0.9∗4.0 = 3.6
rvsink = aspvsink ∗aimvsink = 0.9∗10.0 = 9.0
R3 = rap = rtsn999 + rtsn499 + ...+ rtsink
= rrootsn999 + rrootsn499 + ...+ rrootsink = 41.4
Return-on-attacks: we calculate roavsn and rvsink by Equation (3.22), ROA2 by
Equations (3.24), (3.25) and (3.26).
roavsn = rvsn/acvsn = 3.6/8.0 = 0.45
roavsink = rvsink/acvsink = 9.0/5.0 = 1.8
ROA3 = roaap = roatsn999 + roatsn499 + ...+ roatsink
= roarootsn999 + roarootsn499 + ...+ roarootsink = 5.85
In terms of the defence mechanism, we can deploy the multi-parent routing
(MPR) scheme for the sensor node proposed in [41], denoted as DefenceMPR.
When forwarding a packet, the node randomly selects one of its parent nodes
to forward the packet. Thus the attacker needs more time to guess which path
to follow in order to reach the sink. We make the assumptions on the metric
values of the vulnerability vsn after deploying the MPR scheme in Table 3.10.
We decrease the attack success probability and compromise rate as the method
complicates the attack but does not eliminate the vulnerability. The method does
not affect the attack cost impact as the tools are the same and the impact measures
the loss after the vulnerability is exploited.
Table 3.10: Metric values for the vulnerability vsn in the WSN after defence.
Mechanism
Metric
aspv acv aimv crv
DefenceMPR 0.6 8.0 4.0 0.003
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We use the framework to analyse whether the defence mechanism is effective
or not based on the network-level security metrics. Figure 3.8 shows the new
attack paths in the network. After deploying the MPR scheme, the three-layered
HARM captures multiple attack paths from a sensor node (i.e., the break-in point)
to the sink. We compare the metrics values before and after the deployment of
the defence mechanism in Table 3.11.
Figure 3.8: Attack paths in the WSN after the deployment of the defence
mechanism.
Table 3.11: Security analysis of the WSN.
Mechanism
Metric
ASP3 AC3 AIM3 MTTC3 R2 ROA2 NAP
No defence 0.35 77.0 46.0 1666.66 41.4 5.85 1
DefenceMPR 0.27 77.0 46.0 3166.66 30.6 4.5 256
After deploying the MPR scheme, ASP3, R3 and ROA3 decrease while MT TC3
increases, which indicates the scheme is effective to lower the attack success
probability, risk, attacker’s gain and extend the mean-time-to-compromise. AC3
and AIM3 do not change as the attack cost and impact values do not change before
and after the defence mechanism. Besides, NAP increases significantly to confuse
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the attacker. Thus, we can conclude the network-level defence mechanism is
effective against the traffic analysis attack.
3.3.3.7 Summary
Using the framework, one can assess the effectiveness of network-level defence
mechanisms deployed for the network based on the security metrics.
Chapter 4
Security Analysis of the
Software-Defined IoT
The SDN is an emerging technology that defines new ways to manage
networks [63, 76, 105, 126]. In the SDN-based architecture, the control logic
is decoupled from the switches and routers and implemented in a logically
centralised controller; the controller communicates with the data forwarding
devices via the southbound application programming interface (API) and also
provides the programmability of network applications via the northbound
API. OpenFlow is the most widely used southbound API which provides the
specifications for the implementation of OpenFlow switches (including the
OpenFlow ports, tables, channel and protocol) [4]. Besides, the SDN is also
foreseen as a promising paradigm for managing large-scale and complex IoT
networks.
In this chapter, we propose a novel approach to address the security issues
arising from the non-patchable vulnerabilities in the IoT devices. We change the
attack surface of the IoT network with the support of SDN functions to increase
the attack efforts by the attackers. Here, we focus on exploitable vulnerabilities
as our attack surface. We discuss related work on the existing SDN solutions
for the IoT and security issues of the SD-IoT, present our proposed defence
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mechanisms and reconfiguration algorithms for changing the topology of the IoT
based on the SDN functions and perform simulations to validate the efficacy of
the mechanisms.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first approach to model and assess
the security of the SD-IoT via the graphical security model while taking into
account the performance of the network. The main contributions are summarised
as follows:
• Design two proactive defence mechanisms that reconfigure the topology of
the IoT network based on the SDN functions (Section 4.1);
• Develop optimal and heuristic reconfiguration algorithms for the
mechanisms (Section 4.1.4);
• Conduct security and performance analysis of the SD-IoT network using
the graphical security model and various metrics (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2);
• Carry out experimental analysis via simulations to investigate the
effectiveness of our proposed defence mechanisms (Sections 4.2.4
and 4.2.5).
4.1 Proactive Defence Mechanisms
In the IoT, heterogeneous devices can have different hardware and software
vendors providing a variety of services. Some software vendors provide updates
periodically; some vendors are unable to do so according to time and cost for
creating patches. Besides, legacy devices in their end-of-life phases cannot
receive updates from their vendors. Hence, non-patchable vulnerabilities leave
the devices exploitable by attackers. To deal with this problem, such as forever-
day vulnerabilities, we change the attack surface of the IoT by reconfiguring the
network topology. We consider the following two cases as some software vendors
may not provide patches for their products, leaving some devices not patchable.
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• Case I: an IoT network with a mix of (i) patchable nodes (which are nodes
with patchable vulnerabilities) and (ii) non-patchable nodes (which are
nodes with non-patchable vulnerabilities).
• Case II: an IoT network with only non-patchable nodes in which (i)
some nodes with “hard-to-exploit” vulnerabilities (e.g., low attack success
probability) (ii) some nodes with “easy-to-exploit” vulnerabilities (e.g.,
high attack success probability).
In the real world, there are more complex cases. For example, the IoT devices
can have a mix of patchable and non-patchable vulnerabilities; non-patchable IoT
devices can have a variety of vulnerabilities in which some are easy to exploit
while others are harder to exploit. However, this work aims to demonstrate the
use of the graphical security model to analyse the effectiveness of reconfiguration
to achieve better security. More cases can be investigated in the future work.
4.1.1 Scenario Description
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been widely used in the IoT
environment monitoring applications because the WSNs are well-suited for long-
term environmental sensing for the IoT applications [78, 103, 123]. Besides,
as sensor networks are usually deployed in an open field with little human
interaction, they are prone to various malicious attacks. The smart home and
wearable health monitoring scenarios in Chapter 3 are not used in this approach
because many SDN solutions for the IoT only support the WSNs for the flexible
network management. Thus, we use the WSNs for both Case I and Case II.
4.1.2 System Model
In the system model, we consider a software-defined sensor network for smart
environment sensing. We make the following assumptions on the network
components. The network contains a base station and two types of heterogeneous
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outdoor sensor nodes with different applications for sensing the environment
(e.g., noise, weather, air quality). The senor nodes collect data and periodically
deliver them to the base station via single hop or multiple hops. The base station
sends the data to the Cloud or remote servers for processing via the Internet.
We make the following assumptions on the network deployment. The network
is deployed in a specific area of our interest (e.g., a campus). Based on [123],
sensor nodes can be placed on the street lights, traffic lights, bus stops or outside
of the buildings to support particular services. Street lights and traffic lights can
provide power supply for the attached sensor nodes. The base station is placed on
the ground without being noticeable. One sensor node at the edge of the network
communicates with the base station directly or via a range extender.
We make the following assumptions on the specifications of the sensor
nodes and the base station. Each sensor node is based on the microcontroller
(e.g., CC2530) and configured with the ZigBee radio module [72] (based on
IEEE 802.15.4 standard). The base station is implemented on the single-
board computer attached with the 2.4 GHz RF transceiver (e.g., CC2500).
We assume the SDN-WISE protocol designed in [46] is applied in the sensor
network as the southbound API between sensor nodes and Controllers to achieve
programmability. The Controller can be implemented using any programming
language and placed in a remote server. A network virtualisation layer, named
WISE-Visor, runs as the proxy between sensor nodes and the Controller. The
base station acts as the gateway between sensor nodes and the Controller and
implements an Adaptation layer to format control packets. After deployment,
each sensor node runs a special protocol to find the next hop towards the
Controller and stores this information in the flow table entry. Once the sensor
node is able to communicate with the Controller, the flow table is continuously
updated based on the commands sent by the Controller. We use a tree topology
as the initial network topology because the tree topology has been widely used
in the wireless sensor networks for data collection applications and supported by
many communication protocols (e.g., ZigBee [72]).
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Besides the above general assumptions, we make the assumptions on the
specific system models for Case I and Case II in the following, respectively.
Any types of the sensor nodes can be used in the system model. The following
assumptions aim to give a more realistic example of how the approach can be
applied to the real-world networks.
• Case I: a software-defined sensor network consists of two types of nodes,
(i) noise sensor nodes and (ii) weather sensor and air quality sensor nodes;
noise sensor nodes are patchable nodes while weather and air quality sensor
nodes are non-patchable nodes.
• Case II: a software-defined sensor network consists of two types of non-
patchable nodes, (i) noise sensor nodes and (ii) weather sensor nodes; noise
sensor nodes have the “hard-to-exploit” vulnerability while weather sensor
nodes have the “easy-to-exploit” vulnerability.
We make the following assumptions on the vulnerability information for both
cases. In Case I and Case II, we assume sensor nodes only have known
vulnerabilities. Unknown vulnerabilities (e.g., zero-day vulnerabilities) can be
considered in the future work. We use two types of vulnerabilities: buffer
overflow and no verification of updates. Buffer overflow attack is one of the
most frequent attacks [38] and has been found in many IoT devices due to the
coding flaws. Lack of update verification is also one of the most common design
flaws in the IoT devices because of the limited resources. Both vulnerabilities
allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code after successful exploit and to
launch further attacks (e.g., Distributed DoS attacks [147]).
In Case I, we assume the noise sensor node has two vulnerabilities in its noise
sensing application: one is a buffer overflow vulnerability; another is that the
application does not verify the integrity of the downloaded updates, which allows
the attacker to execute arbitrary code via Trojan horse update [2]. We assume
the weather and air quality sensor node has two buffer overflow vulnerabilities:
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one is in the weather application and another is in the air quality application. In
Case II, we assume both noise sensor nodes and weather sensor nodes have one
buffer overflow vulnerability in their applications while the vulnerability in the
noise sensing application is harder to exploit by the attacker. We summarise the
types of nodes and the node vulnerability information in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Vulnerability information of sensor nodes in Case I and Case II.
Node Application Vulnerability Information
Case I
Noise sensor node Noise
Buffer overflow Patchable
No verification of updates Patchable
Weather and air
quality sensor node
Weather Buffer overflow Non-patchable
Air quality Buffer overflow Non-patchable
Case II
Noise sensor node Noise Buffer overflow Hard to exploit
Weather sensor node Weather Buffer overflow Easy to exploit
4.1.3 Attacker Model
As the sensor network is deployed in the open area to monitor the environment,
an attacker can easily get access to the sensor nodes and compromise them. We
assume an outsider attacker in the attacker model. The outsider attacker is an
unauthorised user who does not have permission to control the sensor network.
The goal of the attacker is to compromise the base station. The assumptions of
the attacker’s capabilities are listed as follows. We use the attacker model for
both Case I and Case II.
• The attacker is able to get access to a certain part of the area with the
deployed sensor nodes and use one node as the entry point.
• The attacker has a laptop-class device configured with the IEEE 802.15.4
radio module. He can exploit any vulnerabilities in the applications of
sensor nodes listed in Table 4.1. Once the node is compromised, the
attacker can inject and run arbitrary codes. He can reprogram the node into
CHAPTER 4. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SOFTWARE-DEFINED IOT91
a malicious one, use it to compromise other nodes by sending malicious
packets, and eventually compromise the base station through using the
sensor nodes as his stepping-stones.
• It is hard for the attacker to compromise the base station directly because
the attacker does not know the position of the base station and the base
station only allows the authenticated sensors to communicate with it.
4.1.4 Reconfiguration Algorithms
For Case I and Case II, we propose two proactive defence mechanisms that
reconfigure the IoT network topology based on SDN functions. We describe our
mechanisms in the following.
• Case I: as the network contains a mix of patchable and non-patchable
nodes, we reconfigure the topology of the initial network by maximising
the number of patchable nodes along the route to the base station.
As the vulnerabilities of the patchable nodes can be patched when the
vendor releases the updates, the patchable nodes will have less number
of vulnerabilities after patching. According to the system model, we
maximise the number of noise sensor nodes with patchable vulnerabilities
along the route to the base station.
• Case II: as the network contains only non-patchable nodes, we reconfigure
the topology of the initial network by maximising the number of sensor
nodes with vulnerabilities which are harder to exploit along the route to the
base station. According to the system model, we maximise the number of
noise sensor nodes with the “hard-to-exploit” vulnerability along the route
to the base station.
We develop reconfiguration algorithms for the two proactive defence
mechanisms, an optimal algorithm in Section 4.1.4.2 and two heuristic algorithms
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in Section 4.1.4.3. The algorithms will be executed in the Controller. The current
algorithms only apply to the nodes with one parent node. This restriction can be
released in the future work to adapt the algorithms to other topologies. Besides,
the algorithms apply to the following two system models: the network consisting
of nodes only with patchable vulnerabilities and nodes only with non-patchable
vulnerabilities or the network consisting of nodes only with “hard-to-exploit”
vulnerabilities and nodes only with “easy-to-exploit” vulnerabilities.
4.1.4.1 General Notations
We list the notations used in the algorithms in the following.
• tbs: the base station in the network
• tsi: the sensor node in the network (i ∈ {1, ...,n} where n is the number of
sensor nodes)
• NT: a set of nodes in the network (NT = {tbs, ts1, ..., tsn})
• SE: a set of connections between nodes in NT (SE⊆NT×NT)
• setsi ,ts j ∈ SE: the bidirectional connection between tsi and ts j
• NG: the graph of the network before reconfiguration (NG = (NT,SE))
• NG∗: the graph of the network after reconfiguration (NG∗= (NT∗,SE∗))
• Hmax: the maximum hop count in NG
• h: a hop count in NG
• l: the reconfiguration limit which is the number of increased hops
• CRtsi : the communication range of tsi
• Dtsi ,ts j : the distance between tsi and ts j
• Htsi : the shortest hop count from tsi to tbs
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• Gtsi : a set of nodes that have the potential new connections with tsi
• tpsi ∈ tsiadj: the current parent node of tsi
• ttpsi : a node that temporarily stores the current parent node of tsi
• tsivuls: a set of vulnerabilities of tsi
• xtsi : 1 indicating tsi is patchable or has “hard-to-exploit” vulnerabilities or
0 indicating tsi is non-patchable or has “easy-to-exploit” vulnerabilities
• Xtsi : the maximum number of patchable nodes or nodes with “hard-to-
exploit” vulnerabilities along the route from tsi to tbs; initial value equals to
xtsi
• Ztsi : a set of values storing the number of patchable nodes or the number of
nodes with “hard-to-exploit” vulnerabilities along the route from tsi to tbs
• Wtsi : a set of potential parent nodes of tsi giving the maximum number of
patchable nodes or the maximum number of nodes with “hard-to-exploit”
vulnerabilities along the route from tsi to tbs
• R(tsi, tbs): the satisfactory condition when there is a route from tsi to tbs,
returning True; otherwise returning False
• L(tsi, tbs, l): the satisfactory condition when the number of increased hops
from tsi to tbs via the new parent and from any node to tbs via tsi is smaller
than or equal to l, returning True; if any result is larger than l, returning
False
• F(tsi): a function that changes the hop count of all child nodes of tsi
4.1.4.2 Optimal Method
We present the optimal reconfiguration algorithm in Algorithm 3. The
algorithm gives the maximum number of patchable nodes in Case I or the
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maximum number of nodes with “hard-to-exploit” vulnerabilities in Case II
without changing the hop count of nodes in the network.





3 for each h∈{2, ...,Hmax} do
4 for each tsi∈{ts1, ..., tsn} ⊆ NT∗ do
5 if Htsi == h then
6 for each ts j∈{ts1, ..., tsn} do
7 if ts j! = tsi and Hts j == h−1 and Dtsi ,ts j <= CRtsi then
8 Add ts j into Gtsi
9 end
10 end
11 Sort Gtsi based on Dtsi ,tsk where tsk ∈ Gtsi
12 for each tsk∈Gtsi do
13 Add xtsi +Xtsk into Ztsi
14 end
15 Xtsi ←MAX(Ztsi )
16 for each tsu∈Gtsi do
17 if xtsi +Xtsu == Xtsi then
18 Add tsu into Wtsi
19 end
20 end
21 if tpsi /∈Wtsi then
22 for each tsq∈Wtsi do
23 Remove estpsi ,tsi
24 tpsi ← tsq








In Algorithm 3, at first, we initialise the network after reconfiguration as the
initial network (line 2). For each hop count starting from 2 to the maximum value
(line 3), we go through each node tsi in the network (line 4). When the node has
the current hop count (line 5), we check any other node ts j in the network whether
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they have one less hop count and whether they are in the communication range
of tsi (lines 6, 7). If all requirements are satisfied, we add ts j into a set Gtsi (line
8). We sort Gtsi based on the node’s distance to tsi (line 11). For each node tsk
in Gtsi , we calculate the sum of xtsi and Xtsk and add the sum into a set Ztsi (lines
12, 13). We assign the maximum sum in Ztsi to Xtsi (line 15). For each node tsu
in Gtsi , we compare the sum of xtsi and Xtsu with Xtsi and add tsu into a set Wtsi if
the sum equals to Xtsi (lines 16 - 18). We check whether the parent of tsi is in Wtsi
(line 21) and keep the current parent of tsi if it is already in Wtsi . Otherwise, we
remove the link between tsi and its parent node, set tsq (the first node in Wtsi with
the closest distance to tsi) as the new parent node, create a link between tsi and tsq
and break the inner loop of Wtsi (lines 22 - 26).
4.1.4.3 Heuristic Method
In the optimal method, the hop count of each node in the network cannot be
changed. In order to release the restriction, we introduce the reconfiguration
limitation which is the number of increased hops after reconfiguration and
develop two heuristic reconfiguration algorithms with the local optimal solution.
The algorithms guarantee the new connection of a node to be a specific type of
parent node in its communication range (i.e., a patchable parent node in Case
I or a parent node with “hard-to-exploit” vulnerabilities) with the maximum
hop count that satisfies the reconfiguration limitation towards the base station.
However, the maximum number of patchable nodes or nodes with “hard-to-
exploit” vulnerabilities along the path to the base station is not guaranteed.
Besides, the algorithms do not maximise the length of the path from the node
to the base station under the reconfiguration limitation. The algorithms that take
consideration of maximising the number of patchable nodes or nodes with “hard-
to-exploit” vulnerabilities and the length of the path under the reconfiguration
limitation can be developed in the future work. Besides, when applying the
heuristic algorithms on the networks repeatedly, changes in the reconfigured
network will be identified when taking it as the input of the algorithms again.
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Both algorithms converge when there are no available parent nodes that can
be connected to (i.e., the patchable nodes or nodes with “hard-to-exploit”
vulnerabilities). We present the heuristic reconfiguration algorithm for Case I
in Algorithm 4.





3 for each tsi∈{ts1, ..., tsn} ⊆ NT∗ do
4 if tpsi is non-patchable then
5 for each ts j∈{ts1, ..., tsn} do
6 if ts j! = tsi and ts j is patchable and Dtsi ,ts j <= CRtsi then
7 Add ts j into Gtsi
8 end
9 end
10 Sort Gtsi based on Htsk reversely where tsk ∈ Gtsi
11 for each tsk∈Gtsi do
12 Remove estpsi ,tsi
13 ttpsi ← tpsi
14 tpsi ← tsk
15 Create estsk ,tsi
16 if R(tsi, tbs) is True and L(tsi, tbs, l) is True then




21 Remove estsk ,tsi
22 tpsi ← ttpsi






In Algorithm 4, at first, we initialise the network after reconfiguration as the
initial network (line 2). For each node tsi in the network (line 3), we check
whether its parent node is patchable or non-patchable (line 4). If the parent node
is non-patchable, we check any other node ts j in the network whether they are
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patchable and whether they are in the communication range of tsi (lines 5, 6). If
all requirements are satisfied, we add ts j into a set Gtsi (line 7). We sort Gtsi based
on the node’s hop count to tbs reversely (line 10). For each node tsk in Gtsi , we
remove the link between tsi and its parent node, store the current parent in ttpsi ,
set tsk as the new parent node and create a link between tsi and tsk (lines 12 -
15). If there is a route from tsi to tbs via tsk and all paths from child nodes of tsi
to tbs do not increase certain number of hops to tbs (line 16), we update the hop
count of tsi and all its child nodes and break the inner loop of Gtsi (lines 17 - 19).
Otherwise, we remove the link between tsi and its new parent node, recover the
original parent node and its connection (lines 21 - 23) and go through next node
in Gtsi .
We present the heuristic reconfiguration algorithm for Case II in Algorithm 5.
This algorithm is similar as Algorithm 4. The differences are in lines 4 and 6: we
check whether the parent node has “easy-to-exploit” vulnerabilities in line 4; we
check whether the vulnerabilities of the node are “hard-to-exploit”.
4.2 Simulations
We carry out simulations to validate the proposed mechanisms. We present
simulation settings, simulation steps, security modelling and analysis of an
example network and simulation results using the optimal and heuristic methods
in this section.
4.2.1 Simulation Settings
In the simulations, we use a software-defined sensor network consisting of 100
sensor nodes and 1 base station. One sensor node at the edge of the network is
connected to the base station directly or via the range extender. Sensor nodes
are randomly deployed in a specific area (e.g., campus [103]). The area has a
high density of outdoor sensor nodes. In specific, we define a simulation area
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3 for each tsi∈{ts1, ..., tsn} ⊆ NT∗ do
4 if tpsi vuls are “easy-to-exploit” then
5 for each ts j∈{ts1, ..., tsn} do
6 if ts j! = tsi and ts jvuls are “hard-to-exploit” and
Dtsi ,ts j <= CRtsi ,ts j then
7 Add ts j into Gtsi
8 end
9 end
10 Sort Gtsi based on Htsk reversely where tsk ∈ Gtsi
11 for each tsk∈Gtsi do
12 Remove estpsi ,tsi
13 ttpsi ← tpsi
14 tpsi ← tsk
15 Create estsk ,tsi
16 if R(tsi, tbs) is True and L(tsi, tbs, l) is True then




21 Remove estsk ,tsi
22 tpsi ← ttpsi






with 360 meters * 360 meters (0.1296 square kilometres). Some sensor nodes are
attached with the street lights or traffic lights for power supply (e.g., the sensor
node connected to the base station) while other sensor nodes are attached to the
bus stops or outside of the buildings. The average distance between the sensor
nodes in the simulation area is 25 meters. The ZigBee specification indicates that
the transmission range of ZigBee is 10 meters to 100 meters depending on the
power output of the individual device and the surrounding environment. We use
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an average communication range of 75 meters in our simulations. We assume the
Controller software implemented and tested in [46] is used in our simulations to
determine the routing policies. The Controller is installed on a remote server and
controls the sensor network via the base station. After deployment, each sensor
node communicates with its neighbours and chooses the closest node towards
the base station in its communication range as the parent node. After the route
discovery to the Controller, sensor nodes form a tree topology.
We use the attacker model specified in Section 4.1.3. In the simulations, we
choose a sensor node which is located at the farthest distance with the base station
as the entry point of the attacker. The attacker exploits this node to compromise
other nodes as the stepping stones towards the base station. The attacker’s
capabilities are modelled via the security metrics, including attack success
probability (e.g., the location of the attacker, the skills required by the attacker
to exploit the vulnerabilities), attack cost (e.g., the tools used by the attacker),
mean-time-to-compromise (i.e., the mean time to exploit the vulnerabilities).
We use several metrics to analyse the security and the performance of the
networks before and after reconfiguration. In particular, we use the attack
success probability, attack cost, mean-time-to-compromise, mean-attack-path-
length, return-on-attacks to analyse the attacker’s effort and gain; we use the
attack impact and risk to analyse the severity of the potential attack. All security
metrics are defined in Section 3.2. We also introduce the average shortest path
length (ASPL) to analyse the network performance. It is used to compute the
average number of hops for all nodes in the network to forward data towards the
base station.
To provide the system information for the IoT Generator, we estimate
the following metric values for the node vulnerabilities: the attack success
probability, attack impact, attack cost and compromise rate. In Case I, we
denote the buffer overflow vulnerability in the noise sensor node as vnoise1 and
the vulnerability of no verification of updates as vnoise2; we denote the buffer
overflow vulnerability in the weather application of the weather and air quality
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sensor node as vwthr1 and the buffer overflow vulnerability in the air quality
application as vair1, respectively. As the tools used by the attacker to exploit
the vulnerabilities are easy to obtain (e.g., Metasploit [1]), we use low attack
cost. For vnoise2, we extract the values of the attack impact and attack success
probability from the CVSS base score [2]. The other three buffer overflow
vulnerabilities allow the attacker to remotely exploit without any authentication.
For vnoise1 and vwthr1, we assume medium access complexity (e.g., require the
attacker with high skill) and the attacker gains full control of the node; thus,
we use medium attack success probability and maximum attack impact; we
estimate the compromise rate as once per week as the attacker needs to be close
to the sensor network. For vair1, we assume low access complexity and the
attacker has partial impact of confidentiality, integrity and availability; thus, we
use high attack success probability and medium impact value; we estimate the
compromise rate as twice per week as the attacker needs to be close to the sensor
network and the vulnerability is easy to exploit. We present the estimated metric
values and the calculated values for the risk and return-on-attacks in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Metric values of node vulnerabilities in Case I.
Metric
Vulnerability
vnoise1 vnoise2 vwthr1 vair1
aspv 0.6 0.55 0.6 1.0
aimv 10.0 9.5 10.0 6.4
acv 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
crv 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.012
rv 6.0 5.2 6.0 6.4
roav 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.6
In Case II, we denote the buffer overflow vulnerability in the noise sensor node
as vnoise3 and the buffer overflow vulnerability in the weather sensor node as
vwthr2. As the tools used by the attacker to exploit vulnerabilities are easy to
obtain, we use low attack cost. For both vulnerabilities, the attacker is able
to remotely exploit the vulnerabilities without any authentication and gains full
control after the node is compromised. We use the maximum impact value. We
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assume vnoise3 requires the attacker with high skill and vwthr2 requires the attacker
with low skill; thus, we use medium attack success probability for vnoise3 and
high attack success probability for vwthr2. To exploit either of the vulnerabilities,
the attacker needs to be close to the sensor network. As vwthr2 is easy to exploit
and vnoise3 is hard to exploit, we estimate the compromise rate as twice per week
for vwthr2 and once per week for vnoise3. We present the estimated metric values
and the calculated values for the risk and return-on-attacks in Table 4.3.










In both cases, we vary the number of noise sensor nodes ranging from 10 to
90 with the increment of 10 in each simulation. Topology reconfiguration needs
to satisfy the wireless communication range of the sensor node. When using the
heuristic method to reconfigure the topology, we specify the number of increased
hops from any node to the base station in the reconfigured network to be no more
than 1, 2 and 3. In Case I, we assume the vendor releases the patch for the buffer
overflow vulnerability in the noise sensor node. Thus, we compare the security
and the performance of both the initial network and the reconfigured network
after the buffer overflow vulnerability is fixed in the noise sensor nodes.
We use Akaroa2 [97] as the simulation environment to validate the simulation
results. Akaroa2 is a tool for improving the credibility of results from quantitative
stochastic simulation using automated sequential analysis. We pass the values of
metrics as the parameters to Akaroa2. Akaroa2 collects a series of observations of
the parameters and calculates a global estimate of each parameter. The simulation
stops until Akaroa2 produces the mean value of the parameter. Therefore, the run
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time of the simulation is determined by Akaroa2.
4.2.2 Simulation Steps
We develop the topology reconfiguration module and integrate it with the
framework described in Section 3.2. Figure 4.1 shows the modified framework.
Figure 4.1: Framework with the topology reconfiguration module.
The framework has five phases: 1) data processing, 2) network reconfiguration,
3) security model generation, 4) security visualisation, 5) analysis and simulation.
We use the framework to carry out the simulations. In each simulation, we
randomly generate a network based on the network information and the node
vulnerability information and also provide the metrics used for the further
analysis (phase 1). We use the reconfiguration algorithm in the reconfiguration
module to change the topology of the initial network (phase 2). Afterwards, we
compute the graphical security models (i.e., the three-layered HARMs) for the
two networks before and after reconfiguration (phase 3). Then, we evaluate the
security and performance of both networks via the Security Evaluator along with
the pre-determined metrics (phase 5). The results of each simulation are fed into
the Akaroa2 which outputs the global estimate of each metric (phase 5).
We compare the security and performance of the networks before and after
reconfiguration based on the mean values of the metrics calculated by Akaroa2.
We use the percentage change to compare the mean metric values of the
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reconfigured network with the mean values of the initial network. We denote
the percentage change as Pchange, the mean metric value of the initial network as
Valueini and the mean metric value of the reconfigured network as Valuerec. We
calculate the percentage change by Equation (4.1). It represents the change of the
mean metric value of the reconfigured network as a percentage of the value of
the initial network. A negative percentage value indicates the metric value of the
reconfigured network decreases while a positive percentage value indicates the
metric value of the reconfigured network increases. We use the absolute value
|Pchange| to decide the minimum and maximum of percentage change. We also
calculate the mean value of the percentage change.
Pchange = [(Valuerec−Valueini)/Valueini]∗100 (4.1)
4.2.3 Security Modelling and Analysis of an Example Network
We use one example network to demonstrate the steps of security modelling
and analysis in the simulation. We use Case I in the example network. The
example network has a total number of 100 nodes with 50 noise sensor nodes
and 50 weather and air quality sensor nodes. We randomly generate a network
with the tree topology and use the optimal method to reconfigure the network
topology. The topologies of the example network before and after reconfiguration
are shown in Figure 4.2. Here, a blue circle represents a noise sensor node and a
red circle represents a weather and air quality sensor node.
We denote the network before reconfiguration as the initial network (sini)
and the network after reconfiguration as the optimal network as the optimal
method is used (sopt). An attacker is able to exploit the sensor node ts95 in the
communication range as the entry point. We construct the three-layered HARMs
for both networks, respectively. We visualise the attack paths captured in the
HARMs in Figure 4.3. In both networks, the attacker is able to compromise some
sensor nodes as stepping stones to eventually reach the node which is directly
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(a) Before reconfiguration.
(b) After reconfiguration.
Figure 4.2: Topologies of the example network before and after reconfiguration.
connected to the base station.
We calculate the security and performance metrics using the Security Evaluator
and show the results of the analysis in Table 4.4. As the optimal method has the
restriction of no hop change, MAPL and ASPL do not change. Compared with
the value in the initial network, AC does not change in the optimal network.
The reasons are explained in the following. At first, all vulnerabilities used
in Case I have the same attack cost. Secondly, the attacker can exploit either
vnoise1 or vnoise2 in the noise sensor node. Therefore, after patching vnoise1 in the
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(a) Attack path in the HARM of the initial network.
(b) Attack path in the HARM of the optimal network.
Figure 4.3: Attack paths in HARMs of the example network.
optimal network, the attack cost values calculated from the vulnerability and then
node levels do not change. As MAPL does not change, AC remains the same.
ASP decreases while MTTC increases, which indicates more effort required by
the attacker to reach the target in the optimal network. ROA decreases, which
demonstrates the less gain of the attacker in the optimal network. Besides, the
attacker has less impact and causes less potential harm on the optimal network as
AIM and R decrease.
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Table 4.4: Values of metrics of the initial network and optimal network.
Metric
Value









4.2.4 Simulation Results using Optimal Method
We compute the mean values of the metrics by Akaroa2 and compare the
metrics before and after reconfiguration by Equation (4.1) in Section 4.2.2. We
present and discuss the results using the optimal method without hop change in
this section.
4.2.4.1 Results of Case I
As the optimal method does not allow hop change in the reconfiguration, values
of MAPL and ASPL in the optimal network remain the same as the values in the
initial network. We plot the results of ASP, AIM, AC, MTTC, R and ROA in
Figure 4.4.
Compared with the values of the metrics in the initial network, ASP, AIM, R
and ROA decrease and MTTC increases in the optimal network for all different
numbers of noise sensor nodes. With the increasing number of noise sensor
nodes, ASP, AIM, R and ROA decrease and MTTC increases, because the noise
sensor node has less number of vulnerabilities than the weather and air quality
sensor node after patch. As the two types of nodes have the same attack cost for
their vulnerabilities and the length of the attack path does not change, AC remains
the same. We present the percentage changes of ASP, AIM, MTTC, R and ROA
in Table 4.5. Minimum, maximum and mean percentage changes are calculated.
CHAPTER 4. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SOFTWARE-DEFINED IOT107
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90























10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90















10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90















10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90





















10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90














10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90




















Figure 4.4: Mean values of metrics in Case I using optimal method.
Attacker’s effort and gain: in the optimal network, ASP decreases
significantly and MTTC increases moderately based on the mean percentage
changes. This indicates the attacker needs to put more effort on compromising
the target in terms of the access complexity and mean compromise time. ROA
decreases slightly, which shows the attacker has less gain in the optimal network.
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Table 4.5: Percentage changes of metrics in Case I using optimal method.
Metric
Percentage
change Minimum Maximum Mean
ASP -61.99% -96.88% -89.09%
AIM -0.43% -1.63% -1.21%
MTTC 4.38% 23.42% 16.57%
R -1.81% -6.35% -4.74%
ROA -1.81% -6.35% -4.74%
Severity of the attack: in the optimal network, R decreases slightly and AIM
does not have much change, indicating that the attacker causes less potential harm
in the optimal network while the impact remains similar.
4.2.4.2 Results of Case II
We plot the results of ASP, AIM, AC, MTTC, R and ROA in Figure 4.5.
Compared with the values of the metrics in the initial network, ASP, R and ROA
decrease and MTTC increase in the optimal network for all different numbers of
noise sensor nodes. With the increasing number of noise sensor nodes, ASP, R
and ROA decrease and MTTC increases, because the vulnerability of the noise
sensor node is harder to exploit than the vulnerability of the weather and air
quality sensor node. As the two types of nodes have the same attack cost and
attack impact for their vulnerabilities and the length of the attack path does not
change, AC and AIM remain the same. We present the percentage changes of
ASP, MTTC, R and ROA in Table 4.6. Minimum, maximum and mean percentage
changes are calculated.
Attacker’s effort and gain: in the optimal network, ASP decreases
significantly and MTTC increases moderately based on the mean percentage
changes. This indicates the attacker needs to put more effort on compromising
the target in terms of the access complexity and mean compromise time. ROA
decreases slightly, which shows the attacker has less gain in the optimal network.
Severity of the attack: R decreases slightly, indicating the less potential harm
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Figure 4.5: Mean values of metrics in Case II using optimal method.
caused by the attacker in the optimal network.
4.2.4.3 Summary
In both cases, by using the optimal method, ASP has significant decrease and
MTTC has moderate increase. The largest change of ASP appears when the
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Table 4.6: Percentage changes of metrics in Case II using optimal method.
Metric
Percentage
change Minimum Maximum Mean
ASP -45.62% -90.15% -78.64%
MTTC 4.24% 23.49% 16.57%
R -3.93% -12.36% -9.37%
ROA -3.93% -12.36% -9.37%
number of noise sensor nodes is within 30 to 50. The performance of the optimal
network remains the same as the initial network because the reconfiguration
algorithm does not change the hop count. Overall, the optimal reconfiguration
algorithm can effectively increase the attacker’s effort in terms of the access
complexity and mean compromise time and maintain the average shortest path
length of the network.
4.2.5 Simulation Results using Heuristic Method
We present and discuss the results using the heuristic method with the
consideration of three reconfiguration limitations. We denote the network before
reconfiguration as the initial network and the network after reconfiguration as the
reconfigured network with the specific reconfiguration limitation.
4.2.5.1 Results of Case I
We plot the results of ASP, AIM, AC, MTTC, R, ROA, MAPL and ASPL in
Figure 4.6. Compared with the values of the metrics in the initial network, metrics
in the reconfigured networks with different reconfiguration limitations have the
following changes: ASP decreases for all different numbers of noise sensor nodes,
MTTC remains similar initially and then increases, AIM, AC, MAPL and ASPL
decrease at first and then increase slightly while R and ROA decrease at first and
then remain similar. With the increasing number of noise sensor nodes, for the
reconfigured networks, ASP decreases, MTTC increases while values of other
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metrics decrease before the number of noise sensor nodes is 20 and then increase
steadily. When the number of noise sensor nodes is small, the sensor nodes
try to connect to patchable parent nodes in their communication range. This
can lead to several nodes connecting to the same parent node which may give
them a path with shorter length to the base station. When the number of noise
sensor nodes is very large, there is not much reconfiguration as the majority of
nodes already connect to patchable noise sensor nodes. Thus, in the reconfigured
networks, MAPL and ASPL decrease when the number of noise sensor nodes
is very small and then increase steadily when the majority of the nodes are
noise sensor nodes. We present the percentage changes of all metrics for the
reconfigured networks with three reconfiguration limitations compared with the
initial network in Table 4.7. Minimum, maximum and mean percentage changes
are calculated.
Attacker’s effort and gain: in the reconfigured networks, based on the mean
percentage changes, ASP decreases significantly and MTTC increases moderately
for all different hop limitations. This indicates the attacker needs to put more
effort on compromising the target in terms of the access complexity and mean
compromise time. ROA decreases moderately, which shows the attacker has less
gain in the reconfigured networks. However, as the heuristic reconfiguration
algorithm does not maximise the length of the path towards the base station,
MAPL and AC decrease slightly, indicating that the attacker compromises less
number of nodes to reach the target and spend less cost in the reconfigured
networks.
Severity of the attack: in the reconfigured networks, R decreases moderately
and AIM decreases slightly for all different hop limitations, indicating that the
attacker causes less potential harm and impact.
Performance: in the reconfigured networks with 1-hop and 2-hop limitations,
ASPL decreases slightly, which shows a slight improvement of the performance.
ASPL in the reconfigured network with 3-hop limitation remains similar as the
value in the initial network.
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(a) ASP.
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(d) MTTC.
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Reconfigured network with 1-hop limitation
Reconfigured network with 2-hop limitation
Reconfigured network with 3-hop limitation
(h) ASPL.
Figure 4.6: Mean values of metrics in Case I using heuristic method.
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Table 4.7: Percentage changes of metrics in Case I using heuristic method.
Metric
Hop Percentage change
limitation Minimum Maximum Mean
ASP
1 -63.45% -94.27% -85.35%
2 -68.81% -94.85% -87.19%
3 -72.22% -95.62% -88.63%
AIM
1 0.77% -19.92% -9.64%
2 1.20% -18.91% -8.18%
3 0.55% -17.79% -6.73%
AC
1 0.05% -18.64% -8.41%
2 0.04% -17.61% -6.93%
3 -1.40% -16.46% -5.45%
MTTC
1 -2.11% 13.81% 8.35%
2 -0.59% 15.51% 10.08%
3 0.92% 17.44% 11.91%
R
1 -0.65% -23.49% -13.25%
2 1.41% -22.58% -11.86%
3 0.43% -21.49% -10.46%
ROA
1 -0.65% -23.49% -13.25%
2 1.41% -22.58% -11.86%
3 0.43% -21.49% -10.46%
MAPL
1 0.05% -18.64% -8.41%
2 0.04% -17.61% -6.93%
3 -1.40% -16.46% -5.45%
ASPL
1 0.12% -12.87% -4.99%
2 -1.20% -10.09% -2.20%
3 -1.30% -7.30% 0.59%
4.2.5.2 Results of Case II
We plot the results of ASP, AIM, AC, MTTC, R, ROA, MAPL and ASPL in
Figure 4.7. Compared with the values of the metrics in the initial network,
metrics in the reconfigured networks with different reconfiguration limitations
have the following changes: ASP decreases for all different numbers of noise
sensor nodes, MTTC remains similar initially and then increases, AIM, AC,
MAPL and ASPL decrease at first and then increase slightly while R and ROA
decrease at first and then remain similar. With the increasing number of noise
sensor nodes, for the reconfigured networks, ASP decreases, MTTC increases,
AIM, AC, MAPL and ASPL decrease before the number of noise sensor nodes is
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20 and then increase steadily while R and ROA decrease before the number of
noise sensor nodes is 30 and then increase slowly. When the number of noise
sensor nodes is small, the sensor nodes try to connect to parent nodes with the
“hard-to-exploit” vulnerability in their communication range. This can lead to
several nodes connecting to the same parent node which may give them a path
with shorter length to the base station. When the number of noise sensor nodes
is very large, there is not much reconfiguration as the majority of nodes already
connect to noise sensor nodes with the “hard-to-exploit” vulnerability. Thus, in
the reconfigured networks, MAPL and ASPL decrease when the number of noise
sensor nodes is very small and then increase steadily when the majority of the
nodes are noise sensor nodes. We present the percentage changes of all metrics
for the reconfigured networks with three reconfiguration limitations compared
with the initial network in Table 4.8. Minimum, maximum and mean percentage
changes are calculated.
Attacker’s effort and gain: in the reconfigured networks, based on the mean
percentage changes, ASP decreases significantly and MTTC increases moderately
for all different hop limitations. This indicates the attacker needs to put more
effort on compromising the target in terms of the access complexity and mean
compromise time. ROA decreases moderately, which shows the attacker has less
gain in the reconfigured networks. However, as the heuristic reconfiguration
algorithm does not maximise the length of the path towards the base station,
MAPL and AC decrease slightly, indicating that the attacker compromises less
number of nodes to reach the target and spend less cost in the reconfigured
networks.
Severity of the attack: in the reconfigured networks, R decreases moderately
and AIM decreases slightly for all different hop limitations, indicating that the
attacker causes less potential harm and impact.
Performance: in the reconfigured networks with 1-hop and 2-hop limitations,
ASPL decreases slightly, which shows a slight improvement of the performance.
ASPL in the reconfigured network with 3-hop limitation remains similar as the
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Figure 4.7: Mean values of metrics in Case II using heuristic method.
value in the initial network.
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Table 4.8: Percentage changes of metrics in Case II using heuristic method.
Metric
Hop Percentage change
limitation Minimum Maximum Mean
ASP
1 -47.12% -83.11% -70.31%
2 -50.92% -84.66% -73.28%
3 -53.81% -86.29% -76.03%
AIM
1 0.20% -18.09% -8.37%
2 -0.08% -17.41% -6.96%
3 -1.43% -16.07% -5.42%
AC
1 0.20% -18.09% -8.37%
2 -0.08% -17.41% -6.96%
3 -1.43% -16.07% -5.42%
MTTC
1 -1.82% 13.62% 8.40%
2 -0.18% 15.42% 10.08%
3 1.05% 17.39% 11.98%
R
1 -2.71% -27.92% -17.92%
2 -0.79% -27.15% -16.67%
3 0.94% -26.06% -15.35%
ROA
1 -2.71% -27.92% -17.92%
2 -0.79% -27.15% -16.67%
3 0.94% -26.06% -15.35%
MAPL
1 0.20% -18.09% -8.37%
2 -0.08% -17.41% -6.96%
3 -1.43% -16.07% -5.42%
ASPL
1 0.07% -12.60% -4.93%
2 -1.16% -9.98% -2.19%
3 -1.25% -7.24% 0.58%
4.2.5.3 Summary
In both cases, by using the heuristic methods, ASP has significant decrease,
ROA and R have moderate decrease and MTTC has moderate increase. The largest
change of ASP appears when the number of noise sensor nodes is within 40 to
50.
In the reconfigured network with 3-hop limitation, for the percentage change,
ASP has the largest decrease, MTTC has the largest increase, MAPL and AC have
the lowest decrease while AIM, R and ROA have the lowest decrease, and ASPL
does not have much change. Conversely, in the reconfigured network with 1-hop
limitation, all security metrics have the opposite trends and ASPL has a slight
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decrease. As the heuristic algorithms do not maximise the length of the path
towards the base station, the changes of the metrics are due to both more number
of patchable nodes or nodes with the “hard-to-exploit” vulnerability along the
path and the shorter length of the path towards the base station. Therefore, among
three different reconfiguration limitations of hops, the reconfiguration with 3-hop
limitation makes the attacker have highest access complexity and longest mean
compromise time, guarantees the lowest decrease of attack path length and attack
cost, and maintains the average shortest path length; however, it also causes the
lowest decrease of potential harm, impact and gain for the attacker.
Overall, the heuristic reconfiguration algorithms can effectively increase the
attacker’s effort in terms of the access complexity and mean compromise time,
decrease the attacker’s gain and the potential harm, and maintain the average
shortest path length of the network.
Chapter 5
Optimal Defence Mechanisms for
the IoT
Deception technology is a proactive approach in cyber defence [5]. It allows
defenders to capture and analyse malicious behaviours by luring the attackers
into the decoy systems within the networks and interacting with the attackers.
As normal users do not know the existence of the decoy systems, defenders
will only get alerts caused by malicious intrusions. It adds an extra layer of
defence onto the traditional security solutions (e.g., Intrusion Detection System
(IDS), firewalls, and endpoint anti-virus software). A honeypot is one of the
commonly used technologies in cyber deception [5]. It is created as a fake
asset and deployed around the valuable assets to divert attackers. However, the
management complexity and scalability issues of the honeypots hinder the wide
usage by the enterprises. Modern deception technology uses basic honeypot
technology with the addition of automation technique [110]. It allows distributed
deployment and update of decoy systems to achieve adequate coverage and
remain cost-effective.
Security patches are used to fix vulnerabilities in the software to prevent
systems from possible exploits thus decreasing the attack surface. However, the
effective patch solution has been a big challenge for the IoT devices. First, many
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manufacturers sell the IoT devices with no mechanism in place for automated
patch updates. They are only in favour of usability but neglect security in the
design phase [74] in order to gain quick access to the IoT market. This leaves
the consumers with unsupported and vulnerable devices after purchase. Second,
some IoT devices (e.g., medical devices) use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
software for the operating system or runtime environment. Patches for the COTS
may not be installed without the validation of the patches by the manufacturers.
In order to patch the IoT devices, the enterprises need to have agreements with the
manufacturers that clarify the obligations for creating and evaluating the patches
for the devices and also testing the patches for the COTS running on the devices
during the lifecycle support.
In this chapter, we propose a novel approach to compute the optimal
deployments of two defence mechanisms for the IoT. The defence mechanisms
are (1) the strategic deployment of adaptive deception technology and (2)
the security patch management solution. We discuss related work on the
selection of optimal defence mechanisms for the IoT and cyber deception
technologies applied in the IoT, present the evaluation metrics along with the
graphical security model for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the
proposed defence mechanisms and the multi-objective optimisation problem for
maximising security and minimising deployment cost, show a case study using
an example network in the smart hospital to demonstrate the viability of the
approach and perform simulations to validate the efficacy of the optimisation
algorithm.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first approach to evaluate the
combinations of deception technology and security patch solution and to compute
the optimal deployments of these mechanisms for the IoT networks via the
graphical security model. The main contributions are summarised as follows:
• Design evaluation metrics and apply the graphical security model to
evaluate the combinations of the modern deception technology and patch
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management solution for the IoT (Section 5.1.4);
• Compute the optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms for the
IoT under the budget constraint via the multi-objective genetic algorithm
(Sections 5.1.5 and 5.2.2);
• Provide the defenders with ways to compare and choose optimal
deployments for the IoT (Section 5.2.3).
5.1 Optimisation Approach
We introduce the system model, defence mechanisms and attacker model
followed by the formulation of the optimisation problem and optimisation steps.
5.1.1 System Model
We consider a general structure of the IoT network which consists of servers,
client machines (e.g., computers) and IoT devices [53, 115]. We assume
traditional defence mechanisms are already deployed on the IoT network,
including IDSs, firewalls and anti-virus software on the servers and client
machines. Additionally, the IoT network has a central patch management system
to patch critical security vulnerabilities in the servers and client machines. Our
focus is to deploy deception technology in the network and patch management
solution for the IoT devices to defend against sophisticated attacks. We present
an example network in Section 5.2.1.
5.1.2 Defence Mechanisms
We use two individual defence mechanisms (the strategic deployment of
adaptive deception technology and the security patch management solution) and
their combinations for the IoT.
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5.1.2.1 Deception Technologies
Once attackers are inside the IoT network, they start probes to acquire
information to determine the potential valuable assets and then move laterally
in the network to launch attacks based on the information they gather during the
probes [13]. In order to successfully lure the attackers, there are several problems
to be considered, including where the decoy systems should be deployed, what
types of decoys should be used and what level of authenticity of the decoys should
be applied. In this section, we discuss these problems and the purchase (capital)
cost associated with these deployments.
Modern deception technologies integrate honeypot technology, visualisation
and automation technologies. There are several emerging vendors (e.g.,
Illusive Networks, Attivo Networks, TrapX, Cymmetria, TopSpin [110]) which
implement modern deception technologies and also provide support for the IoT
networks in various domains (e.g., smart home, smart office, healthcare).
There are two types of decoys/traps utilised throughout the network:
emulation-based and full operating system (OS) based. Both emulation-based
and full OS-based decoys can be autonomously created to fit within the
environment with no changes to the existing IT infrastructure. They provide
a variation of interactive capabilities. Emulated decoys allow the defenders to
create a variety of fake assets (e.g., the IoT devices, endpoints, servers, routers)
and to provide a large-scale coverage across the network. Full OS-based decoys
allow replication of the actual production devices to increase the possibility of
engagement with the attacker and to reveal the attacker’s intention. In order
to increase the overall decoy access, the combinations of the decoys should
resemble the real usage of the network devices and guarantee the decoy diversity.
In addition, decoys are suggested to be deployed in every VLAN of the network.
Deception technologies are implemented in different ways by different
vendors [6, 10–12]. In general, the implementation usually consists of an
intelligence centre and various types of decoys. The intelligence centre is used
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to create, deploy and update a distributed decoy system, provide automated
attack analysis, vulnerability assessment and forensic reporting, and integrate
with other prevention systems (e.g., security incident and event management
platform, firewalls) to block attacks. The decoy system includes the decoys
that are deployed across the network. The intelligence centre can be purchased
as a platform including hardware appliances and software. The decoys can be
purchased individually with an annual license fee based on the number of servers,
client machines and IoT devices to be protected.
5.1.2.2 Patch Management
The IoT network often consists of various types of the IoT devices that are
produced by different manufacturers. We assume the enterprises have the annual
maintenance contracts with these manufacturers for repair and upgrade services.
However, there is no patch management solution for the IoT devices. Therefore,
for each type of the IoT devices, the enterprises can make additional annual
agreements with the manufacturers for the patch management solutions with a
certain amount of investment. In the real world, there are more complex cases.
For instance, different IoT devices produced by the same manufacturer can get
the patch support in one contract; some manufacturers cannot provide patches for
the IoT devices. However, this work aims to demonstrate the approach to select
optimal deployments of defence mechanisms. More cases can be investigated in
the future work.
5.1.3 Attacker Model
We assume an outsider attacker in the attacker model. The goal of the attacker
is to steal private data from the IoT networks and sell it for economic gain. The
assumptions of the attacker’s capabilities are listed as follows.
• The ability to detect the deception depends on the knowledge gap between
the attacker and reality. We assume a sophisticated attacker who has a high
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probability to recognise the emulated decoy but may not be able to detect
the full OS-based decoy.
• Once the attacker interacts with the decoy, his behaviour will be monitored.
So if the attacker finds out the device is a decoy after interaction, he needs
to terminate his actions immediately and find new ways to break into the
network.
• The attacker is able to find exploitable but un-patched vulnerabilities
or unknown vulnerabilities to compromise the servers and client
machines [29].
• The attacker is able to exploit the vulnerabilities in the un-patched IoT
devices via well-hidden malware (e.g., re-packing, polymorphism) and
use them to compromise other devices (e.g., installation of backdoors for
persistent attacks) [7].
5.1.4 Problem Formulation
We formulate the optimisation problem for the defence mechanisms in this
section. We first introduce the deployment vector as the problem input and three
evaluation metrics used in the evaluation of the deployments, followed by the
definition of the optimisation problem.
We use the definitions of the IoT network and the graphical security model
in Section 3.2 and add the description of decoy nodes. An IoT network can be
defined as IoT = (S, T , V ) where S is a finite set of subnets, T is a finite set of
nodes and V is a finite set of vulnerabilities. For each node t ∈ T , we add three
attributes as follows.
• tdecoy ∈ {False,True}: indicate the node is either real or decoy.
• tpr ∈ (0,1]: demonstrate the probability that an attacker will interact with
the node and use it as the stepping stone to compromise other nodes; if
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the node is real, the attacker will have the probability of 1 to exploit the
vulnerabilities and then use it to compromise other nodes; if the node is
a decoy, the attacker may figure out the trap after interaction and then
terminate his behaviour, or may not detect the trap and be diverted to other
decoy nodes afterwards; we assume the attacker will not completely avoid
the decoy, thus there is no zero probability.
• tcost: show the deployment cost of the decoy (i.e., 0 if tdecoy ≡ False).
5.1.4.1 Deployment Vector
We assume the IoT network is divided into several VLANs (i.e., subnets). All
decoy nodes deployed across the network have different types. Let Yd denote the
set of node types for deception deployment and Yp denote the set of the IoT types
for patch management. We define the deployment vector as follows.
Definition 1. The deployment vector dv is defined as an integer valued vector.
The function o : Yd → {0,1,2} describes the integer value for each type of decoy
deployment in the network. The function q : Yp → {0,1} describes the integer
value of the patch solution for each type of the IoT nodes in the network. Let dvd
denote the deployment vector for the deception technology and dvp denote the
deployment vector for the patch management. We denote the deployment vectors
in the following:
• dvd = (o(type1), o(type2), ..., o(type|Yd|)).
• dvp = (q(type1), q(type2), ..., q(type|Yp|)).
• dv = dvd ∪ dvp.
We assume at least one server decoy should be deployed in the network to
engage with the attackers. Therefore, for the server decoy, the integer value
indicates the specific type of server decoy is not deployed (0), emulated (1) or full
OS-based (2). We use emulated decoys for the client machines and IoT devices.
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So the integer value means that a specific type of decoy is either deployed (1) or
not (0). For the patch management, the integer value shows that a specific type
of the IoT devices can be either patched (1) or not patched (0).
5.1.4.2 Evaluation Metrics
We assume an attacker may have one or multiple targets in the network for
achieving his goal (e.g., steal data stored in servers). For each target, the attacker
may be able to find multiple attack paths to reach it via one or multiple entry
points. We consider a set of attack paths AP for reaching all the targets from all
possible entry points. We divide AP into two sets: APr to represent the set of
attack paths with the real nodes as targets and APd to represent the set of attack
paths with the decoy nodes as targets. As the attacker will terminate his behaviour
once the trap is detected, APr only contains real nodes.
We introduce three new metrics (1) decoy node fraction (DNF), (2) node
interaction probability (NIP), (3) the residual cost fraction (RCF) as the
evaluation metrics. We also use three cost metrics for the deployment of
deception technology and patch solution in the calculation of the residual cost
fraction.
We propose DNF as the first evaluation metric. The decoy node fraction is
defined as the average fraction of the decoy nodes among all nodes along the
attack path towards the decoy target. Let apdt (ap∈AP) denote the set of decoy








We propose NIP as the second evaluation metric. The decoy interaction
probability is defined as the average probability that an attacker will interact with
the nodes along the attack path and eventually reach the decoy target. We show
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We propose RCF as the third evaluation metric. We first define the residual cost
as the total cost of the deployment of all potential defence mechanisms subtracted
by the cost of one deployment. Then the residual cost fraction is the residual cost
divided by the total cost. To simplify the calculation of this metric, we assume
the manufacturer charges the patch management solution for the same type of the
IoT devices at a fixed price. Additionally, we assume all decoys are different to
guarantee the diversity of the decoy system as identical decoys are suspicious to
attackers.
We introduce three cost metrics used in the calculation of RCF: the cost for
purchasing the intelligence centre as a platform denoted as IC, the total patch
management cost for the IoT devices denoted as PMC and the deployment cost
of all decoys denoted as DC. Let TC denote the total cost and pmctype denote the
patch solution cost for one type of the IoT devices. We show the calculations of
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As the IoT devices are usually used as the entry points by the attacker, patching
the IoT devices reduces the number of entry points and the number of attack
paths towards the targets. Besides, the decoy node fraction and node interaction
probability are attack path-based metrics. Therefore, the effect of patching can
be expressed by the evaluation metrics.
5.1.4.3 Optimisation Problem
The optimisation problem is a multi-objective problem to maximise the decoy






Given that each deployment of the defence mechanisms entails purchase and
maintenance cost, the optimisation problem is to compute a set of Pareto optimal
points [92] that provides a reasonable balance between the effectiveness and
efficiency of the deployments of the defence mechanisms. Let DV denote all
possible deployments of the defence mechanisms for a given IoT network and
PP = {DNF(IoT,dv), NIP(IoT,dv), RCF(IoT,dv) | dv ∈DV} denote all possible
values of the evaluation metrics for the given DV . We define the Pareto optimal
points in our optimisation problem as follows.
Definition 2. The Pareto optimal points POP for the three-objective
optimisation problem are {(dnf ∗, nip∗, rcf ∗) ∈ PP} ⇐⇒ @ (dnf , nip, rcf ) ∈
PP such that dnf ≥ dnf ∗ ∧ nip≥ nip∗ ∧ rcf ≥ rcf ∗, and dnf > dnf ∗ ∨ nip > nip∗
∨ rcf > rcf ∗.
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5.1.5 Optimisation Steps
We discuss the optimisation steps in this section. We modify the framework
in Section 3.2 by adding the Deployment Generator, Deployment Evaluator and
Optimisation Module. The new framework is shown in Figure 5.1 which consists
of five phases: 1) data processing, 2) deployment generation, 3) security model
generation, 4) deployment evaluation and 5) deployment optimisation.
Figure 5.1: Framework with the optimisation steps.
In phase 1, the security decision maker provides the IoT Generator with the
system information to construct an IoT network. The inputs include the network
information and node vulnerability information.
In phase 2, given the network, we list all potential deployments of the
defence mechanisms and represent them in the integer formats. The Deployment
Generator randomly generates a set of different deployments. For each
deployment of the defence mechanisms, we will feed it into the network and
also pass it onto the Optimisation Module for further analysis.
In phase 3, we generate the three-layered HARM of the given IoT network
with the deployment of the defence mechanisms. The Security Model Generator
takes the constructed network as input and automatically generates the HARM in
which all possible attack paths are captured in the model.
In phase 4, the Deployment Evaluator is used to evaluate the deployments of
the defence mechanisms for the network. The three-layered HARM with the
attack path information is taken as input into the Deployment Evaluator along
with the determined evaluation metrics. The evaluation results are generated by
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the Evaluator and fed into the Optimisation Module.
In phase 5, the optimal deployments are computed by the Optimisation
Module. Based on the initial set of the deployments and the associated evaluation
results, the Optimisation Module applies the multi-objective genetic algorithm to
compute the optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms for the IoT network
based on the termination conditions (e.g., the maximum number of generations
defined by the security decision maker).
There are several reasons we select the genetic algorithm (GA) to solve the
multi-objective optimisation problem. First, GA provides a simple way to encode
the candidate solutions. As we use integer values to represent the deployment of
the defence mechanisms, binary encoding can be easily applied to convert the
integer values into binary values for our defence mechanisms. Second, due to
the rapidly growing IoT network, scalability of the algorithm becomes a critical
issue. However, GA requires little information to search effectively in a large
search space which satisfies the requirement of an IoT network with a large
number of nodes. Specifically, we choose one of the widely used GAs named
NSGA-II in [40] as the optimisation algorithm. NSGA-II is defined as a fast
sorting and elite multi-objective genetic algorithm and is able to find better spread
of solutions.
5.2 Case Study
We use an example network in the smart hospital scenario. As a hospital system
contains highly valuable information, attackers can have high economic gain for
selling healthcare data in the black market. In this section, we introduce the
example network and explain the steps for solving the optimisation problem via
the proposed framework. Our approach is not limited to this specific case but
applicable to the general IoT networks.
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5.2.1 Example Network
We consider the picture archive and communication system (PACS) in a smart
hospital network. The system consists of the PACS servers for the storage
of image information from multiple source machine types, the PACS client
machines to access the images and the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT)
using radiology techniques [7, 8] to send images to servers. The PACS uses
digital imaging and communications in medical (DICOM) standard as the
communication protocol between the IoMT devices and the PACS servers. The
example PACS network is shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: An example PACS network.
The PACS network is divided into three VLANs by the external and internal
firewalls. The PACS servers use the active-active high availability cluster
configuration to ensure reliable data storage and access. The redundant servers
are identical in terms of both hardware and software. The PACS clients are
computers with the DICOM viewers. The IoMT devices include Ultrasound
machine, MRI machine, digital X-Ray machine and CT scanner. As these
IoMT devices are closed systems, additional security software cannot be easily
integrated into the devices. Besides, patches for the COTS running on the IoMT
devices need to be verified and tested by the manufacturers due to safety issue.
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We make assumptions for the operating systems (OSs) and applications running
on the devices: each PACS server runs a Linux OS and is installed with the PACS
software and database (e.g., MySQL); the PACS client machines run two types
of OSs, including Windows 8 and Windows 10; the IoMT devices run Windows
7. All the chosen OSs and applications are commonly used in the PACS.
We use the attacker model described in Section 5.1.3. Specifically, the attacker
is able to wrap highly capable attack tools into the obsolete malware (e.g., MS08-
067), use it to exploit the vulnerabilities in the un-patched IoMT devices and
become un-detected by the anti-virus software running on other devices [7, 8].
For the servers and client machines, the known but un-patched vulnerabilities
can be collected from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). We assume
the attacker is able to exploit the client machines and IoMT devices as entry
points, then move laterally in different VLANs of the network and eventually
reach the servers for stealing private data.
The intelligence centre is purchased as a platform and decoys are purchased
individually with an annual license fee. The IoMT devices are purchased
from different manufacturers. The hospital has maintenance support from the
manufacturers for the cleaning, repair and upgrade services but without the
coverage of security updates. Thus the hospital needs to make additional
contracts with the manufacturers separately for the patch management support.
We investigate the prices of the deception products [131,132] and service fees for
the IoMT devices [9, 86–88]. The estimated prices for the defence mechanisms
are shown in Table 5.1.
5.2.2 Computation of the Optimal Deployments
We consider a small-scale PACS network, including 2 PACS servers, 10 PACS
client machines (5 running Windows 8 and 5 running Windows 10) and 4 different
IoMT devices. The network is divided into three VLANs: servers in VLAN1,
client machines in VLAN2 and IoMT devices in VLAN3.
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Full OS (Linux) 1,500
Emulation (Linux) 400
PACS Client Windows 8 300
(Emulation) Windows 10 300
Ultrasound 200








We assume each device has one known but un-patched vulnerability that can
be exploited by the attacker to gain the root permission. Therefore, if the un-
patched Windows 7 in the IoMT device is patched, there is no other exploitable
vulnerability. We also assume each decoy has one vulnerability to lure the
attacker. More vulnerabilities can be used based on the real configuration of
the decoys. Besides, for the emulated decoy, the attacker has a probability of
0.5 to interact with it, exploit the vulnerability and then use it to compromise
other devices; for the full OS-based decoy, this probability is 0.9. The probability
values can be estimated based on the real configuration of the decoys.
Based on the concepts of GA [92], a population represents a group of
potential deployments of the defence mechanisms; a chromosome corresponds
to a deployment vector; a generation is one time of algorithm iteration; fitness
values are determined by the evaluation metrics (i.e., fitness functions). We use
the following algorithm parameters: population size = 100, maximum number of
generations = 100, crossover rate = 0.8 and mutation rate = 0.2.
We first generate the PACS network via the IoT Generator. The network is
represented as IoTpacs = (Spacs, Tpacs, Vpacs) where Spacs = {svlan1, svlan2, svlan3},
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Tpacs = {tsvr1, tsvr2, tclt1, ..., tclt10, tiomt1, ..., tiomt4} and Vpacs = {vsvr1, vsvr2, vclt1,
..., vclt10, viomt1, ..., viomt4}. We show a list of attributes (used in the optimisation
problem) for tiomt1 as an example.
• tiomt1type = Ultrasound (Win7)
• tiomt1decoy = False
• tiomt1pr = 1.0
• tiomt1cost = 0
Given the network, we have the potential deployments of the defence
mechanisms based on the types of devices as follows.
• Yd = {PACS server (Linux), PACS client (Win8), PACS client (Win10),
Ultrasound (Win7), MRI (Win7), XRay (Win7), CT (Win7)}
• Yp = {Ultrasound (Win7), MRI (Win7), XRay (Win7), CT (Win7)}
Given the potential deployments, we randomly generate a population of
different deployments DVpacs (|DVpacs| = 100). We show one example of the
deployment vector (dv1).
dv1d =(o(PACS server (Linux)),o(PACS client (Win8)),o(PACS client (Win10)),
o(Ultrasound (Win7)),o(MRI (Win7)),o(XRay (Win7)),o(CT (Win7)))
=(2,1,0,1,0,0,0)
dv1 p =(q(Ultrasound (Win7)),q(MRI (Win7)),q(XRay (Win7)),q(CT (Win7)))
=(1,0,1,1)
dv1 =dv1d ∪dv1 p = (2,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,1)
Afterwards, the PACS network is reconstructed with the defence mechanisms.
For example, using dv1, three decoy nodes are added into the network (tsvrd1,
tcltd1 and tiomtd1) and three IoMT devices are patched (tiomt1, tiomt3 and tiomtd4).
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We show a list of attributes (used in the optimisation problem) for tiomtd1 as an
example.
• tiomtd1type = Ultrasound (Win7)
• tiomtd1decoy = True
• tiomtd1pr = 0.5
• tiomtd1cost = 200
The reconstructed network is fed into the Security Model Generator to
construct the three-layered HARM and to capture the potential attack paths. We
show the attack paths in the HARM for the network with the deployment vector
dv1 in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: HARM for the PACS network with the deployment vector dv1.
From Figure 5.3, the attacker is able to take the client machines in VLAN2 and
IoMT devices in VLAN3 as entry points and then move laterally in the network
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to eventually reach the servers. As decoys are also deployed in the network, the
attacker may be lured into the decoys. Once the attacker interacts with the decoy,
he either detects the decoy and terminates his behaviour, or is diverted to another
decoy. We show the attack paths with the decoy servers as targets APd = {tiomt2
→ tcltd1 → tsvrd1, tiomt2 → tsvrd1, tiomt2 → tclt1/.../tclt10 → tsvrd1, tiomtd1 → tsvrd1,
tclt1/.../tclt10→ tsvrd1, tcltd1→ tsvrd1}.
The three-layered HARM with the attack path information is taken as input into
the Security Evaluator to evaluate the deployment of the defence mechanisms.




























The Optimisation Module takes the initial population of the deployments
(DVpacs) and the corresponding fitness values (PPpacs) as inputs and then
computes the optimal deployments via the multi-objective GA. We show the final
population of the fitness values in Figure 5.4 which forms the Pareto optimal
points (POPpacs).
There are four labelled points in Figure 5.4 which represent the deployments
with one maximum fitness value respectively. We show the deployment vector
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Decoy Node Fraction






































Figure 5.4: Final population of the deployments.
for each point as follows:
• A∗: dvA∗ = (2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1)
• B∗: dvB∗ = (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1)
• C∗: dvC∗ = (2,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1)
• D∗: dvD∗ = (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)
Points A∗ and B∗ have the maximum decoy node fraction. In these two
deployments, all decoys are deployed and all IoMT devices are patched. The
only difference is that point A∗ represents the deployment with the full OS-
based server decoy and point B∗ represents the one with the emulated server
decoy. Points C∗ has the maximum node interaction probability and represents
the deployment with the full OS-based server decoy deployed and all the IoMT
devices patched. Point D∗ has the maximum residual cost fraction and represents
the deployment with one emulated server decoy deployed. These deployments
will be used to test the algorithm accuracy in Section 5.3.
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5.2.3 Analysis and Comparison of the Defence Mechanisms
In this section, we analyse the optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms
and compare the optimal deployments with the deployments of the individual
defence mechanisms. We introduce several metrics which are used in the
following analysis: the percentage of decoys among all real devices (PD),
percentage of patched devices among all real devices (PPD), number of attack
paths towards the real targets (NAPRT calculated by |APr|), number of attack
paths towards the decoy targets (NAPDT calculated by |APd|) and deployment
cost of the defence mechanisms (DCDM).
5.2.3.1 Analysis of the Optimal Deployments
We assume the hospital has a budget for the security investment and use the
budget and total cost to calculate the minimum residual cost fraction. Here,
we use a budget of 25000 USD and calculate the minimum RCF which is
approximately 0.322. We show the deployments which satisfy the budget
constraint in Figure 5.5 (i.e., the points that are above 0.322 in Figure 5.4).



























Figure 5.5: Deployments which satisfy the budget constraint.
In order to balance the effect of the two evaluation metrics in Figure 5.5, we
introduce two weight values for the two metrics, denoted as β and γ , in which
β represents the importance of DNF and γ represents the importance of NIP.
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We calculate the weighted metric by βDNF + γNIP (β + γ = 1). We use the
weight value of β ranging from 0 to 1 (with the increment of 0.1) and show
the points with the maximum weighted metric in Figure 5.5. We summarise the
corresponding deployment vector and the weight values of β for each point in the
following:
• P1: dvP1 = (1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0); β = 1
• P2: dvP2 = (2,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0); β = 0, 0.1
• P3: dvP3 = (2,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0); β = 0.2, 0.3, 04
• P4: dvP4 = (2,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,0,1,0); β = 0.5
• P5: dvP5 = (2,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,0); β = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
Point P1 represents the deployment with the maximum decoy node fraction.
Other points represent the deployments with one or multiple maximum weight
metric values. We calculate the decoy percentage PD and patch percentage PPD
for each point to indicate the coverage of the defence mechanisms. We show the
values of two evaluation metrics (DNF and NIP) and percentage values for each
point in Table 5.2 (in the order of the increasing weight value of β ).
Table 5.2: Comparisons among the optimal deployments.
Point DNF NIP PD PPD
P2 0.388 0.892 12.5% 0.0%
P3 0.414 0.886 12.5% 12.5%
P4 0.431 0.874 18.8% 12.5%
P5 0.482 0.802 43.8% 6.3%
P1 0.483 0.450 31.3% 12.5%
From point P2 to point P4 in Table 5.2, DNF, PD and PPD increase while NIP
decreases with the increasing value of β , which indicates the higher percentages
of the decoys and the patched IoMT devices, and the higher decoy authenticity
(deployment of the full OS-based server decoy) when the importance of DNF
increases. However, values of PD for the three points are much lower than
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the values of points P5 and P1. Point P5 has the maximum PD, relatively
high values of DNF and NIP and a low value of PPD, which demonstrates the
maximum percentage of the decoys, high decoy authenticity but a low percentage
of the patched IoMT devices. Point P1 has the maximum DNF and PPD, a
low value of NIP and a relatively high value of PD, which demonstrates the
high percentages of the decoys and the patched IoMT devices but a low decoy
authenticity (deployment of all emulated decoys).
Among the points P1, P2, P3 and P4, we can see that there is a balance between
the decoy percentage and decoy authenticity. Point P1 has a good percentage
of the decoys (more decoys to trap the attackers) but low authenticity of the
decoys (lower probability to interact with the attackers once they are diverted
to the server decoy) while the other three points have the opposite effect. Point
P5 achieves a good percentage of the decoy and high authenticity of the decoys
but has a low percentage of the patched IoMT devices. Besides, points P1, P3 and
P4 have a good patch percentage. In order to facilitate the decision making on the
optimal deployment of the defence mechanisms by the defenders, we summarise
the analysis results in the following:
• Choose the deployment using dvP5 to achieve high decoy coverage and
decoy authenticity;
• Choose the deployment using dvP1 to achieve high decoy coverage and
patch coverage;
• Choose the deployment using dvP4 to achieve high decoy authenticity and
patch coverage.
5.2.3.2 Comparison of the Defence Mechanisms
We compare the three optimal deployments of the two defence mechanisms
with the deployments of only deception or only patch solution in Table 5.3 using
PD, PPD, NAPRT , NAPDT and DCDM. Additionally, we patch all the IoMT
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devices by using only patch solution and deploy the full OS-based server decoy
and all the other potential decoys by using only deception mechanism.
Table 5.3: Comparisons among the deployments of the defence mechanisms.
Defence
Metric
PD PPD NAPRT NAPDT DCDM
No defence 0.0% 0.0% 108 0 0
Only patch 0.0% 25.0% 20 0 14000
Only deception 43.8% 0.0% 108 68 22900
Both with dvP1 31.3% 12.5% 64 40 24400
Both with dvP4 18.8% 12.5% 64 34 24900
Both with dvP5 43.8% 6.3% 86 55 23900
From Table 5.3, compared with no defence, different combinations of the
defence mechanisms increase the security of the IoT network at different aspects.
The deployment of patch solution has the highest patch percentage and lowest
number of real attack paths. However, once the attacker breaks into the network,
the real devices are the only targets and the behaviour of sophisticated attackers
may not be detected. The deployment of deception has the highest decoy
percentage and highest number of fake attack paths but remains the highest
number of real attack paths. The deployments of both patch and deception
decrease the number of real attack paths significantly and introduce the fake
attack paths to divert the attacks from the real assets. Therefore, the combinations
of the two defence mechanisms are more effective to increase the security of the
IoT networks with a reasonable cost.
5.3 Simulations
We compare the GA with the exhaustive search algorithm (ESA) in terms of
time efficiency and accuracy of results. Here the accuracy refers to the ratio
between the number of deployments with the maximum fitness value of one
fitness function in the final population using the GA and that in the Pareto optimal
points using the ESA. All simulations are performed using the computer equipped
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with a 3.4 GHz CPU under Linux Mint 18.1 Serena and Eclipse Neon.1 with
Python 2.7.
We consider the IoT networks with the similar structure of the example network
used in the case study along with the attacker model in Section 5.1.3. We use the
network with a fixed number of servers and client machines and an increasing
number of the IoT devices with different types to investigate the impact of
growing IoT devices on the proposed approach. Specifically, we use 2 servers,
50 client machines with two types of OSs. The number of the IoT devices
ranges from 50 to 200 with an increment of 25 in each simulation. Servers,
client machines and different types of the IoT devices are deployed in different
VLANs. We assume every 25 IoT devices have the same type and belong to
the same manufacturer. Each manufacturer makes agreement with the enterprise
to implement patch solutions for the IoT devices at a different price (ranging
from 1000 to 4000 with a difference of 500 for each agreement). Prices for
the deception products are the same as the prices shown in Table 5.1. We use
the following algorithm parameters for the simulations: population size = 100,
maximum number of generations = 100, crossover rate = 0.8 and mutation rate =
0.2.
We show the time comparison of two algorithms in Figure 5.6. We use the
number of nodes with different types (in the form of server-client machine-IoT)
along with the number of bits used for the binary encodings of the deployments
as labels. Initially, when the scale of the network is small, the ESA runs faster
than the GA. However, with the increasing number of encoding bits, the time of
the ESA increases exponentially while the time of the GA increases linearly.
We show the accuracy ratios of the GA compared with the ESA in Table 5.4.
When the number of encoding bits ranges from 8 to 14, the accuracy ratio is 1.0
as the set of deployments with one maximum fitness value calculated by the GA
is equal to the set of deployments with one maximum value calculated by the
ESA. The ratio decreases when the number of encoding bits is equal to or larger
than 16. We increase the population size and the maximum generation of GA and































Figure 5.6: Runtime comparison of the GA and the ESA.
run the simulations with the same networks. We obtain the ratios of 1.0 for all
these networks with a slightly higher runtime.
Table 5.4: Accuracy ratios of GA.
Network
Population Maximum Runtime Accuracy
size generation (minute) ratio
2-50-50 (8) 100 100 4 1.0
2-50-75 (10) 100 100 7 1.0
2-50-100 (12) 100 100 9 1.0
2-50-125 (14) 100 100 12 1.0
2-50-150 (16)
100 100 16 0.75
100 150 22 1.0
2-50-175 (18)
100 100 20 0.75
150 150 40 1.0
2-50-200 (20)
100 100 22 0.5
150 200 67 1.0
In summary, we can conclude that the GA is much efficient than the ESA when
the size of the IoT network increases and is able to obtain a good spread of the
optimal deployments within a reasonable time.
Chapter 6
Discussions
The work presented in the thesis addresses all the research questions outlined
in Chapter 1 by developing the security assessment framework for the IoT,
developing the proactive defence mechanisms for the software-defined IoT with
the non-patchable vulnerabilities, and developing the optimisation approach to
compute the optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms. However, various
assumptions have been made in the thesis that limit the scope of the research.
In this chapter, we discuss the usability of the proposed approaches, address the
limitations and point out possible extensions in the future work.
6.1 Usability
To address the research question Q1 in Section 1.2, we have developed
the security assessment framework for the IoT to capture the potential attack
scenarios and analyse the security of the IoT. In the security assessment
framework, we have developed an IoT Generator, a Security Model Generator
and a Security Evaluator. The IoT Generator creates an IoT network based
on the subnet reachability information, node connectivity for each subnet and
vulnerability information for each node; the Security Model Generator constructs
the three-layered HARM based on the given IoT network to discover all possible
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attack paths; the Security Evaluator analyses the security of the network using
various security metrics. If different defence mechanisms are deployed in
the IoT networks (both in device-level and network-level), the framework is
able to calculate the security metrics for these mechanisms for comparing the
effectiveness among them. Thus, the impact of various potential attacks can be
mitigated by choosing and deploying the most effective defence mechanisms.
When using the communication protocols as the subnet classification method,
some IoT devices with multiple communication modules provide connections
among different subnets. These vulnerable cross-protocol devices create
additional attack paths traversing different subnets and lead to unpredictable
attacks. Therefore, the IoT devices that connect different subnets and extend
the attack paths can be identified by the three-layered HARM. Potential
countermeasures could be deployed on the cross-protocol IoT devices to prevent
the spread of the attacks. In the three use cases for evaluating the framework,
all the constructed IoT networks use the real-world vulnerability information
(e.g., CVE or existing literature) and the topology information based on the
assumptions of the real networks. Therefore, when applying the framework to
the real-world IoT networks, the inputs will not have much difference compared
with the system information used in the evaluation. Moreover, the framework is
developed for the IoT but can also be used for the general computer networks.
Based on the unique features of the two types of the networks, there will be
different system models (i.e., many IoT devices use wireless communication
protocols and the communication ranges of the devices affect the topology
construction; the vulnerability information of the IoT devices is harder to obtain
compared with that of the hosts in the computer networks as there are very few
vulnerability scanners for the IoT), attacker models (e.g., attackers are easier to
compromise the IoT devices as many of them are deployed in the open field) and
defence mechanisms (e.g., traditional defence mechanisms may not be suitable
for the IoT devices because of the limited computational power) provided to the
framework. However, the procedures to compute the potential attack scenarios
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and to analyse the security of the networks will be the same.
To address the research question Q2 in Section 1.2, we have utilised the
SDN technique and developed two proactive defence mechanisms for the
software-defined sensor networks in the IoT scenario with the non-patchable
vulnerabilities. The idea behind the proposed mechanisms is to change the attack
surface of the network in order to increase the attacker’s efforts to compromise
the target. We have considered two cases. In Case I, the network consists of a
mix of the patchable and non-patchable nodes (i.e., nodes with only patchable
vulnerabilities and nodes with only non-patchable vulnerabilities); the proactive
defence mechanism is to maximise the number of the patchable nodes along
the route to the base station. In Case II, the network has only non-patchable
nodes; the defence mechanism is to maximise the number of nodes with the
vulnerabilities which are harder to exploit along the route to the base station.
From the simulations, the attacker’s efforts to reach the target are increased when
using the sensor nodes as the stepping stones after the topology reconfiguration.
As there are many papers on the implementation of the SDN solutions
for the WSNs, we have applied the mechanisms onto the IoT-enabled sensor
networks. The idea of the topology reconfiguration can be applied to other
IoT-enabled networks when the SDN solutions are supported and implemented
to achieve the flexible network management. Besides, the system model is
constructed based on the real-world network deployment, device specification
(e.g., the communication protocols), SDN implementation and vulnerability
information. Therefore, the proposed mechanisms are applicable to the real-
world IoT networks.
To address the research question Q3 in Section 1.2, we have developed the
optimisation approach and considered two defence mechanisms: (1) the modern
deception technology and (2) security patch solution. The patch solution is one
of the traditional defence mechanisms and used to reduce the attack surface
while the modern deception technology is a proactive defence mechanism that
can effectively defend against the sophisticated attackers by luring them into the
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decoys. The optimal deployments of the combinations of these two mechanisms
are computed and compared via the optimisation approach to maximise the
security of the IoT while minimising the deployment cost.
The proposed approach can be applied to any IoT networks with the potential
deployments of these two defence mechanisms. Besides, the approach can be
applied to decide the deployments of the decoys individually for the analysis
of the modern deception technology on the IoT. Moreover, the computation
of the optimal deployments of these two mechanisms based on the evaluation
metrics and the comparisons among the individual and combined usages of the
defence mechanisms provide insights on the investigation of combinations of
other traditional and modern defence mechanisms.
6.2 Limitations and Future Work
There are several limitations in the thesis that can be investigated in the future
research to extend the scope of the work.
Methodology: the methodology requires the collection and abstraction of the
information from the systems and the real-world attacks followed by the proposed
approaches and the framework. It aims to define the scope of the problem at
first and then provide the solution. The computed results via the framework are
affected by the estimated values of the inputs which may have some variation
based on the semi-qualitative and semi-quantitative standard of the metric values.
Security assessment framework: we can use more scenarios as the use cases
to evaluate the framework. Besides, the extensions could focus on the security
analysis under different attacker models and framework validation shown in the
following:
• More types of the attacker models could be considered in the security
analysis of different use cases. For example, DDoS attacks target a
single system using a large number of zombie computers (infected by
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malwares). It is more disruptive for the IoT as the IoT devices can be easily
compromised due to the limited security protections, and then controlled
by the attackers as zombie devices [147]. Moreover, such attacks have
already been carried out by the attackers in the real world. Thus analysing
DDoS attacks via the graphical security model and finding the protection
strategies to mitigate the impact of these attacks could be a promising
research direction.
• Experiments could be performed in the real testbed to validate the
framework. We could either design and set up a small-scale IoT system
or use the existing testbeds [23, 99]. For example, we could design a smart
sensing system consisting of various types of sensors (e.g., light sensor,
sound sensor, ultrasonic range sensor, and temperature and humidity
sensor) to monitor the environment, carry out attacks on the sensors, obtain
the data from the testbed and feed it into the framework.
Securing the software-defined IoT: we can carry out simulations using
different IoT scenarios (e.g., smart hospital, smart building) to evaluate the
proactive defence mechanisms. Besides, the extensions could focus on the
development of the reconfiguration algorithms and the design of the proactive
defence mechanisms shown in the following:
• We have assumed that every IoT node in the network can be reconfigured.
In some cases, critical devices cannot be reconfigured (e.g., sensors in
the Body Sensor Network). We could consider more reconfiguration
restrictions according to different networks in different scenarios to adapt
the algorithms to the realistic cases.
• The current algorithms work for the nodes with one parent. We could
release this restriction and design the algorithms for various network
topologies (e.g., mesh, and cluster-tree).
• The optimal algorithm maximises the number of patchable nodes or nodes
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with “hard-to-exploit” vulnerabilities along the path to the base station with
the restriction of no changes of the hop counts. The heuristic algorithms
release this restriction by introducing hop limitation after reconfiguration
but do not maximise the number of patchable nodes or nodes with “hard-to-
exploit” vulnerabilities along the path to the base station. We could develop
algorithms that take consideration of maximising the number of patchable
nodes or nodes with “hard-to-exploit” vulnerabilities along the path to the
base station and the length of the path under the reconfiguration limitation
of different hop changes.
• In the real world, the IoT devices may have a mix of the patchable and non-
patchable vulnerabilities; non-patchable IoT devices may have a variety of
vulnerabilities in which some are easy to exploit while others are hard to
exploit. We could design more proactive defence mechanisms for these
complex cases and implement the algorithms for the mechanisms.
• We have not considered the behaviour changes of the sensor nodes over
time. The concept of ”Temporal-HARM (T-HARM)” has been introduced
in [146] to capture the changes of the network at different time points and
compute the graphical security model for the snapshot of the network at
each time point. We could use the T-HARM to capture the behaviour
changes of the sensor nodes and reconfigure the topology of the network
when changes occur.
• We have used the average shortest path length to analyse the performance
of the network after reconfiguration. However, the distances between
different nodes also affect the performance of the sensor nodes. We could
consider the response time as the performance metric to investigate the
effectiveness of the mechanisms.
• When the network is compromised by the attacker, taking timely reactive
actions is of vital importance. Based on the SDN functions, networks
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can be reconfigured quickly and flexibly through the control plane. We
could patch the non-compromised and patchable nodes to prevent potential
attacks and isolate the compromised and non-patchable nodes when nodes
are under attacks. We could also analyse the effectiveness of the reactive
defence mechanisms with the support of the SDN via the framework.
Optimal defence mechanisms: we can use more case studies to analyse the
effect of the defence mechanisms. Besides, the extensions could focus on the
usage of the defence mechanisms and evaluation of the optimisation algorithms.
• We have used the annual license fee as the deployment cost of an individual
decoy and the annual service fee as the deployment cost of the patch
management solution for the IoT devices. We could consider the long-
term effect of the annual fees on the deployment costs of both deception
and security patch mechanisms.
• When analysing the optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms in
the case study, we have assumed that each decoy is configured to have
one vulnerability. We could use the real configurations of the decoys and
make more realistic assumptions for the interaction probability values in
the analysis.
• We have chosen the GA as the optimisation algorithm in the framework.
We could evaluate other algorithms to find the most efficient algorithm for
the optimisation problem.
Mobility of the IoT: we have assumed that the IoT topology is static
throughout the thesis. However, one of the key features of the IoT is mobility. The
movement of the heterogeneous devices has a great influence over the security of
the IoT as the attack surface changes with the dynamically changing network.
In different scenarios, the IoT devices have different movement patterns. Thus,
a mobility model could be designed to capture the node movement in the
network (e.g., nodes join or move out) and notify changes to other models
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in the framework. In the wireless communication networks, mobility models
have been designed and extensively used in the evaluations of the network
protocols. In particular, a mobility model is used to describe the movement
pattern of mobile objects and to represent changes of their location, velocity
and acceleration over time [21]. The mobility models have been classified
based on their characteristics, which include the random-based models [26, 32],
models with temporal dependency or spatial dependency [25, 62], models with
geographic constraints [70, 135], etc. The initial research has been done by
one student in our lab. The work includes the discussion of current mobility
models, integration of several mobility models with the graphical security model
to capture the movement of the IoT devices regarding different scenarios and
analysis of the impact of node movements on the IoT security. Future work
could focus on the integration of different mobility models to be adapted to more
realistic and complex IoT scenarios.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Improving the security of the IoT is a difficult task as the IoT consists of a
large number of heterogeneous and resource constrained devices with numerous
exploitable vulnerabilities (some vulnerabilities may be non-patchable). In the
thesis, we have made distinctive contributions to the knowledge in the domain
of the IoT security modelling and assessment for mitigating the impact of the
potential attacks targeting the IoT.
We have presented a security assessment framework for the IoT and provided
a formal definition of the framework. We have also introduced three example
networks in three different IoT scenarios, which are smart home, healthcare
monitoring and environment sensing, and evaluated the framework via these
scenarios. All possible attack paths have been computed by the three-layered
HARM and the values of the chosen security metrics have been calculated in the
security analysis phase. From the analysis results, the security decision maker is
able to decide the most vulnerable part of the network, to assess the effectiveness
of different defence mechanisms and to choose the most effective way to protect
the network, thus mitigating the impact of the potential attacks.
In order to deal with the non-patchable vulnerabilities, we have considered
two cases and presented two proactive defence mechanisms to change the attack
surface of the software-defined sensor networks in the IoT scenarios. We have
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developed both optimal and heuristic reconfiguration algorithms for the two cases
to change the network topology according to the proactive defence mechanisms
and integrated the algorithms into the framework. We have analysed the security
and performance of the network via the graphical security model and various
metrics. We have carried out simulations to evaluate our mechanisms. The
simulation results have shown the mechanisms effectively increase the attack
effort in terms of the attack success probability and mean-time-to-compromise
and maintain the network performance in terms of the average shortest path
length.
In order to improve the security of the IoT under the budget constraint, we have
provided a novel approach to compute the optimal deployments of two defence
mechanisms for the IoT networks. We have defined three evaluation metrics for
assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the deployments and formalised the
optimisation problem. We have chosen the GA as the optimisation algorithm and
integrated the algorithm and the evaluation metrics with the framework to carry
out the computation of the optimal deployments of the defence mechanisms. We
have shown the feasibility of the proposed approach via a case study. We have
also performed simulations to compare the GA with the ESA in terms of runtime
efficiency and result accuracy. Simulation results have demonstrated that the GA
is time efficient and obtains a good spread of deployments.
Overall, the security assessment framework with the reconfiguration and
optimisation modules is capable of discovering the potential attack paths in
the IoT and evaluating the effectiveness of the defence mechanisms to mitigate
the impact of potential attacks, changing the attack surface of the software-
defined IoT with the non-patchable vulnerabilities to increase the attacker’s
efforts and optimising the deployments of the defence mechanisms under the
budget constraint for the IoT.
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[129] D. Singelée, B. Latré, B. Braem, M. Peeters, M. Soete, P. Cleyn,
B. Preneel, I. Moerman, and C. Blondia. A Secure Cross-Layer Protocol
for Multi-hop Wireless Body Area Networks. In Proceedings of the
7th International Conference on Ad-hoc, Mobile and Wireless Networks
(ADHOC-NOW ’08), pages 94–107. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.
[130] T. Stepanova and D. Zegzhda. Applying Large-scale Adaptive Graphs
to Modeling Internet of Things Security. In Proceedings of the 7th
International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN
’14), pages 479–482. ACM, 2014.
[131] P. Stephenson.
Attivo BOTsink Deception Platform. https://www.scmagazine.com/
attivo-botsink-deception-platform/review/7062/, 2016. Last
accessed: 2017-11-10.
[132] P. Stephenson. TrapX Security’s DeceptionGrid. https://www.
scmagazine.com/trapx-securitys-deceptiongrid/article/
681820/, 2017. Last accessed: 2017-11-10.
[133] C. W. Ten, C. C. Liu, and M. Govindarasu. Vulnerability Assessment of
Cybersecurity for SCADA Systems Using Attack Trees. In Proceedings
of the 2007 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, pages 1–8.
IEEE, 2007.
[134] T. Theodorou and L. Mamatas. Software Defined Topology Control
Strategies for the Internet of Things. In Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE
Conference on Network Function Virtualization and Software Defined
Networks (NFV-SDN ’17), 2017.
REFERENCES 171
[135] J. Tian, J. Hahner, C. Becker, I. Stepanov, and K. Rothermel. Graph-Based
Mobility Model for Mobile Ad Hoc Network Simulation. In Proceedings
of 35th Annual Simulation Symposium, pages 337–344. IEEE, 2002.
[136] A. B. Torjusen, H. Abie, E. Paintsil, D. Trcek, and A. Skomedal. Towards
Run-Time Verification of Adaptive Security for IoT in eHealth. In
Proceedings of the 2014 European Conference on Software Architecture
Workshops (ECSAW ’14), pages 1–8. ACM, 2014.
[137] B. Trevizan de Oliveira, C. Borges Margi, and L. Batista Gabriel.
TinySDN: Enabling Multiple Controllers for Software-Defined Wireless
Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE Latin-America
Conference on Communications (LATINCOM ’14), pages 1–6. IEEE,
2014.




[139] N. Vidgren, K. Haataja, J. L. Patino-Andres, J. J. Ramirez-Sanchis,
and P. Toivanen. Security Threats in ZigBee-Enabled Systems:
Vulnerability Evaluation, Practical Experiments, Countermeasures, and
Lessons Learned. In Proceedings of the 2013 46th Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS ’13), pages 5132–5138. IEEE,
2013.
[140] A. Woo, T. Tong, and D. Culler. Taming the Underlying Challenges of
Reliable Multihop Routing in Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of the
1st International Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems
(SenSys ’03), pages 14–27. ACM, 2003.
[141] A. Wood and J. Stankovic. Denial of Service in Sensor Networks.
Computer, 35(10):54–62, 2002.
REFERENCES 172
[142] D. Wu, D. I. Arkhipov, E. Asmare, Z. Qin, and J. A. McCann.
UbiFlow: Mobility Management in Urban-scale Software Defined IoT. In
Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
(INFOCOM ’15), pages 208–216. IEEE, 2015.
[143] T. Xu, D. Gao, P. Dong, H. Zhang, C. H. Foh, and H. C. Chao. Defending
Against New-Flow Attack in SDN-Based Internet of Things. IEEE Access,
5:3431–3443, 2017.
[144] J. C. Yang and B. X. Fang. Security model and key technologies
for the Internet of things. Journal of China Universities of Posts and
Telecommunications, 18, Supplement 2:109–112, 2011.
[145] T. Yu, V. Sekar, S. Seshan, Y. Agarwal, and C. Xu. Handling a Trillion
(Unfixable) Flaws on a Billion Devices: Rethinking Network Security for
the Internet-of-Things. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Workshop on Hot
Topics in Networks (HotNets-XIV ’15), pages 1–7. ACM, 2015.
[146] S. E. Yusuf, M. Ge, J. B. Hong, H. Alzaid, and D. S. Kim. Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Security Metrics for Dynamic Networks. In Proceedings
of the 2017 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ICESS, pages 277–284. IEEE,
2017.
[147] C. Zhang and R. Green. Communication Security in Internet of Thing:
Preventive Measure and Avoid DDoS Attack over IoT Network. In
Proceedings of the 18th Symposium on Communications & Networking




All the work presented in the thesis has been published or submitted in the
peer-reviewed conferences and journals listed in the following.
1. M. Ge, and D. S. Kim, Optimal Deployments of Defense Mechanisms for
the Internet of Things, submitted to the 17th IEEE International Conference
on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications
(TrustCom ’18), August 2018.
2. M. Ge, J. B. Hong, S. E. Yusuf, and D. S. Kim, Proactive defense
mechanisms for the software-defined Internet of Things with non-patchable
vulnerabilities, Future Generation Computer Systems, Volume 78, Part 2,
2018, Pages 568-582.
3. M. Ge, J. B. Hong, H. Alzaid, and D. S. Kim, Security Modeling and
Analysis of Cross-Protocol IoT Devices, In Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE
Trustcom/BigDataSE/ICESS Workshops, 2017, Pages 1043-1048.
4. M. Ge, J. B. Hong, W. Guttmann, and D. S. Kim, A framework for
automating security analysis of the internet of things, Journal of Network
and Computer Applications, Volume 83, 2017, Pages 12-27.
5. M. Ge, H. Kim, and D. S. Kim, Evaluating Security and Availability
of Multiple Redundancy Designs when Applying Security Patches, In
APPENDIX A. RELATED PUBLICATIONS 174
Proceedings of the 2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference
on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops (DSN ’17), 2017.
6. M. Ge, D. S. Kim, A Framework for Modeling and Assessing Security of
the Internet of Things, In Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE 21st International
Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems Workshops (ICPADS ’15),
IEEE Computer Society, 2015, Pages 776-781.
